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Does the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution re-quire judges to exempt religious objectors from the appli-
cation of nondiscriminatory and otherwise applicable laws?
Over the last twenty years, judges and academics have debated
fiercely whether the Clause should be interpreted to provide re-
ligiously observant citizens with a right to “free exercise exemp-
tions.”  The debate has led indirectly to a new interest in
nineteenth-century views on free exercise jurisprudence.  In this
Article, I will examine the scholarship on nineteenth-century free
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exercise jurisprudence to date and ask what it adds to our under-
standing of the Clause and the question of exemptions.
The recent turn to nineteenth-century free exercise history has
been led by originalists.  Leading originalists have claimed to find
in nineteenth-century cases support for their competing interpre-
tations of the Free Exercise Clause’s original understanding.
Some argue that these cases support the idea that Americans at
the time of the Founding agreed that constitutional guarantees of
free exercise provided citizens with a right to free exercise ex-
emptions.  Ironically, others argue that nineteenth-century texts
provide strong evidence that the Founding generation was in con-
sensus that these guarantees did not provide such a right.
I will argue here that the research presented by each group of
originalists is selective, and their conclusions are ultimately not
convincing.  If we look at the full range of texts available, nine-
teenth-century legal literature demonstrates that free exercise
was a contentious subject throughout the country’s early history
and up through the Reconstruction era. Nineteenth-century
texts thus do little to support either of the proposed “originalist”
interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause.  If anything, they
suggest no consensus existed at the time of the Founding about
whether constitutional free exercise guarantees provided citizens
with a right to exemptions.
Nevertheless, I will argue that a study of these materials may
still contribute to contemporary debates over the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause, as they can help us contextualize and bet-
ter understand the earliest U.S. Supreme Court opinions in the
area of free exercise.  Today, the earliest Supreme Court prece-
dents are almost universally thought to support an antiexemp-
tions reading of the U.S. Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.1
Free exercise cases such as Reynolds v. United States  are cited in
support of the Supreme Court’s current antiexemption jurispru-
dence.2  Those who argue for a more liberal interpretation of the
1 Among the early precedents are Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. United States , 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason , 133 U.S. 333
(1890), overruled in part by  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); and Reynolds v.
United States , 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
2 The Supreme Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith  stated:
“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law
not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.  The mere
possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 3  9-MAR-07 8:56
2006] Free Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of Polygamy 371
Free Exercise Clause have felt constrained to get around these
early precedents either by arguing that one should return to a
liberal original understanding of the Clause,3 or by arguing that
these precedents have been implicitly overruled by later cases.4
In a recent opinion, Justice Souter noted that, notwithstanding
the contemporary consensus, judges in the past seem to have
considered early Supreme Court cases like Reynolds5  to be con-
sistent with a judicial policy of granting exemptions.6  Without
taking a position on how we should interpret the early cases, Jus-
tice Souter called for scholars and judges to return to cases like
Reynolds  and ask whether the conventional wisdom about these
cases is correct.7  This seems wise.  However, for a reevaluation
of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of polit-
ical responsibilities (footnote omitted).”  We first had occasion to assert
that principle in Reynolds v. United States  . . . .
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)); cf.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court rightly “departs from the teaching of
Reynolds v. United States”).
3 See, e.g. , City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-66 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); cf.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,  508 U.S.
520, 575 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  In
his concurrence, Justice Souter stated:
This is not the place to explore the history that a century of free-exercise
opinions have overlooked, and it is enough to note that, when the opportu-
nity to reexamine Smith  presents itself, we may consider recent scholarship
raising serious questions about the Smith  rule’s consonance with the origi-
nal understanding and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye , 508 U.S. at 575.
4 Flores , 521 U.S. at 508 (majority opinion); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye ,
508 U.S. at 570-71 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(stating that it is “difficult to escape the conclusion that, whatever Smith ’s virtues,
they do not include a comfortable fit with settled law”); Yoder , 406 U.S. at 247
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (approving the Court’s decision to grant exemptions
but noting that the Court again, as it had done before, was “depart[ing] from the
teaching of Reynolds v. United States ,” and thus that the Court had overruled
Reynolds).
5 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
6 According to Justice Souter:
As for the cases on which Smith primarily relied as establishing the rule it
embraced, Reynolds v. United States  and Minersville School District v.
Gobitis , their subsequent treatment by the Court would seem to require
rejection of the Smith rule. Reynolds . . . has been read as consistent with
the principle that religious conduct may be regulated by general or target-
ing law only if the conduct “pose[s] some substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order.”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye , 508 U.S. at 569 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
7 Specifically, Justice Souter stated:
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to be trustworthy, the words and ideas in these cases will have to
be read in a manner that is sensitive to their context.  Among
other things, scholars will need to think about the way in which
nineteenth-century Americans conceptualized and discussed free
exercise exemptions and must ask whether nineteenth-century
Americans would have understood the implications of the Reyn-
olds  opinion differently than we do today.  I will suggest some
ways that the study of nineteenth-century materials may help us
if we wish to reexamine the original understanding of cases like
Reynolds .  This Article will proceed in five parts.
Part I of this Article will define “free exercise exemptions” and
describe the appearance over the last twenty years of literature
discussing nineteenth-century views on the question of exemp-
tions.  It then will describe the way in which debates about the
original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause have helped
drive the study of nineteenth-century legal history.  Originalist
scholars have proposed two competing theories about nine-
teenth-century jurisprudence.  One group argues that nineteenth-
century judges emphatically denied that free exercise clauses im-
plied an individual right to exemptions.  To their mind, this sug-
gests an original understanding of free exercise guarantees that
did not allow exemptions.  Another originalist group argues that
nineteenth-century legal materials were ambiguous and not cate-
gorically hostile to exemptions.
Part II of this Article will explain the method that I use to
reanalyze the nineteenth-century free exercise tradition, with the
hope of supplementing and, in places, reevaluating the conclu-
sions in contemporary originalist literature.
Part III will review the nineteenth-century materials that deal
specifically with the subject of exemptions.  I will focus on a wide
range of cases, including some only recently discovered, and I
will also look at academic commentaries that discuss exemp-
tions—a body of material that has been largely untouched by
current scholarship.  Based on these sources, I will argue that
nineteenth-century judges and commentators accepted a com-
Exactly what [Reynolds  and Davis v. Beason] took from the Free Exercise
Clause’s origins is unclear.  The cases are open to the reading that the
Clause sometimes protects religious conduct from enforcement of gener-
ally applicable laws; that the Clause never protects religious conduct from
the enforcement of generally applicable laws; or that the Clause does not
protect religious conduct at all.
Id.  at 575 n.6 (citations omitted).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 5  9-MAR-07 8:56
2006] Free Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of Polygamy 373
mon framework for analyzing the notion of “free exercise” and
determining whether free exercise clauses provide citizens with a
right to exemptions.  However, from the start, these same judges
and commentators diverged widely on the question of whether
free exercise clauses required judges to grant exemptions and, if
so, under what circumstances.  Some early nineteenth-century
judges and commentators interpreted free exercise clauses in an
antiliberal fashion that precluded any possibility of exemptions—
a philosophy that antiexemption originalists attribute to Jeffer-
son and, indeed, to almost all Americans at the end of the eight-
eenth century.8  However, from a fairly early period onward, a
significant number disagreed.  They interpreted free exercise
clauses with the type of liberal, exemptions-friendly approach
that at least one leading pro-exemption originalist associates with
the Founders.9
I thus conclude in Part IV that nineteenth-century free exer-
cise jurisprudence does not provide meaningful support for ei-
ther the antiexemptions originalist position or the pro-exemption
originalist position.
Part V argues that if a study of nineteenth-century legal texts is
to be useful to us, it will not be because it supports a particular
originalist reading of the Federal Free Exercise Clause.  Rather,
8 See, e.g. , Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption:
An Historical Perspective , 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 922-23 (1992) (associating
Jefferson with an extreme antilibertarian position on all questions of religious free-
dom, including “[i]f a person was not a good and peaceable citizen, he could be
penalized on account of his religion”); cf.  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion , 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409,
1449-52 (1990) (describing Jefferson’s antiexemptions views and arguing that they
were rejected in favor of a more liberal position).
9 Michael McConnell attributes a free exemptions position to Madison and be-
lieves that Madison’s position is representative. See, e.g. , McConnell, supra  note 8,
at 1452-55 (arguing that “Madison, with his more generous vision of religious liberty,
more faithfully reflected the popular understanding of the free exercise provision
that was to emerge both in state constitutions and the Bill of Rights”). But see Ge-
rard V. Bradley, Beguiled:  Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liber-
alism , 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 259 (1991) (“Even so appealing a formulation as
Madison’s (which McConnell endorses) . . . is inconclusive.”); Hamburger, supra
note 8, at 926 (“[E]ven Madison did not believe that the right of free exercise in-
cluded a right of religious exemption from civil laws.”); Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause:  Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth
Amendment , 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1114-18 (1994) (“Jefferson and Madison were
both what I call ‘separationist’ republicans . . . . The federalist First Amendment left
little room for religious exemptions.  When the federalist reading of the Bill of
Rights is combined with separationist assumptions, the door to religious exemptions
seems to close.”).
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it will be useful because nineteenth-century writings on free exer-
cise help us to contextualize the earliest Supreme Court cases
dealing with free exercise.  As I point out, nineteenth-century
texts do not just discuss the question of free exercise exemptions
generally, but they discuss with surprising regularity the question
of whether religiously motivated polygamists could claim a First
Amendment right to be exempted from antipolygamy laws.  This
is, of course, precisely the issue that was addressed in Reynolds
and its progeny.  Most interesting is that courts and commenta-
tors who seemed to interpret free exercise guarantees to provide,
at least in some circumstances, a right to religious exemption, all
agreed that the right did not extend to polygamists.  The Reyn-
olds  opinion in places seems to echo these thinkers as much as it
does the opinions of antiliberal thinkers who would deny that
citizens ever had a right to exemptions.  There is not room here
to consider fully whether the Reynolds  Court, when it denied a
Mormon polygamist a right to exemptions, thought it was (or was
understood to be) adopting the antiliberal view that courts can
never grant free exercise exemptions.  A subsequent article will
address this question.  At this point, I will simply demonstrate
that nineteenth-century legal writings not only problematize the
leading originalist readings of the Free Exercise Clause, but they
also provide evidence that will be essential to any person at-
tempting to fully understand Reynolds and its progeny.10
I
THE DEBATE ABOUT FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTIONS:  THE
TURN TO ORIGINALISM AND COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF
NINETEENTH-CENTURY FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
In the 1990 case of Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith , a bare majority of five
Justices decided that the Free Exercise Clause could not be inter-
preted to provide a right to free exercise exemptions.11  The ma-
jority’s reasoning was vigorously attacked in both a
concurrence12 and a dissent.13  In subsequent cases dealing with
10 In this Article, I will only be able to highlight the type of information that is
available in nineteenth-century texts and explain why it should be relevant to people
seeking a more nuanced reading of early cases like Reynolds .  In a subsequent arti-
cle, I will take up the challenge of rereading these cases.
11 494 U.S. 872, 882-85 (1990).
12 Id.  at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
13 Id.  at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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religious freedom, a significant minority of Justices has gone out
of its way to demand that the issue of exemptions be revisited.14
Since then, academics have engaged in a spirited debate about
whether the Smith  opinion was correctly decided.15  The twenti-
eth-century precedents in the area of free exercise are anything
but consistent, and the policy issues they implicate are extremely
complex.  Scholars and jurists have not been able to forge agree-
ment about how twentieth-century cases should be interpreted or
about the difficult policy questions that they raise.
A. The Increasing Importance of Originalist Scholarship
Addressing the Question of Free Exercise Exemptions
The debate about free exercise exemptions was intensifying in
the 1980s, even before Smith  was decided.  As it did, some aca-
demics suggested that the Supreme Court might be able to side-
step the difficulty of making sense of precedents and policy.
They proposed to look for an “original understanding” of the
Free Exercise Clause.16  After the Smith  decision and the storm
14 See, e.g. , City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-48 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
559 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); cf. Flores ,
521 U.S. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
15 The list is extremely long.  For representative examples, see Christopher L. Eis-
gruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:  The Constitutional
Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct , 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Marci A.
Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the Whole:  A View from the
Clergy , 18 J.L. & POL. 387 (2002); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and
the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism , 1993 BYU L. REV. 259; William P. Mar-
shall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism , 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308
(1991); Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall , 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 329 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision , 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
16 For representative articles looking for a general understanding of “free exer-
cise” at the time of the Founding, see Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A
Heritage of Religious Liberty , 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1630-34 (1989) (arguing that
the First Amendment should be read to allow judicially created exemptions from
generally applicable law because the first generation of Americans enacted statutes
exempting believers from some laws to which they were religiously opposed); Brad-
ley, supra  note 9, at 307 (concluding that “conduct exemptions cannot be squared
with an originalist account of constitutional law”); Hamburger, supra  note 8;
Michael W. McConnell, supra note 8 (arguing on the basis of a wide range of evi-
dence that there was consensus among the first generation of Americans that the
Free Exercise Clause permitted the judicial grant of free exercise exemptions); Rod-
ney K. Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back On Again:  A Reexamination
of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a
Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions , 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569,
635-36 (1984) (arguing that there was consensus among the first generation of
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of controversy that it provoked, Justices on the Supreme Court,
even some who are not normally associated with originalism,
agreed that this might be useful.  Noting that the Smith Court did
not consider the question of original understanding, these Jus-
tices urged the Court to take a new free exercise case so that the
Court could reconsider the question of free exercise exemptions,
taking into account the original understanding of the Free Exer-
cise Clause.17
Originalism has not provided the easy answers that some had
promised.  Eighteenth-century texts, particularly those written at
the time of the Founding, fail to demonstrate an unambiguous
consensus on the question of exemptions.  Some researchers of
these texts have made strong arguments that the first generation
of Americans interpreted free exercise clauses to provide a right
to exemptions.  Others, however, have made equally strong argu-
ments that early Americans had an antiexemptions interpreta-
tion of free exercise clauses.18  In the years after Smith , Justices
who opposed Smith ’s bar on exemptions were able to cite
learned academic articles attributing to the Founders a pro-
exemptions position.19  In response, Justices who wished to retain
the exclusion announced in Smith  have cited equally learned arti-
cles attributing to the Founders precisely the opposite position.20
It is worth looking closely at originalists’ competing interpreta-
tions of eighteenth-century literature.  Most contemporary analy-
ses of nineteenth-century free exercise jurisprudence have been
written against the backdrop of originalist literature, and their
authors used the nineteenth-century materials with an eye to sup-
Americans that the Free Exercise Clause permitted the judicial grant of free exercise
exemptions); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions , 4
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591, 623-33 (1990) (arguing that “it is sim-
ply not credible to say that the free exercise clause . . . was intended to give persons
or churches the right to disobey laws with impunity provided they had religious rea-
sons for wishing to do so”).  The issue also is discussed in Lash, supra  note 9, at
1111-18 (“The federalist First Amendment left little room for religious exemptions.
When the federalist reading of the Bill of Rights is combined with separationist as-
sumptions, the door to religious exemptions seems to close.”).  There have also been
numerous articles looking at the views of particular thinkers who were active around
the time that the U.S. Constitution was being drafted and ratified.
17 See, e.g. , Flores , 521 U.S. at 548-64 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id.  at 565-66
(Souter, J., dissenting); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye , 508 U.S. at 574-75 (Sou-
ter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
18 See  discussion infra  Part I.B.
19 Id.
20 Compare Flores , 521 U.S. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part), with id.  at
548-64 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), and id.  at 565-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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porting or rejecting one of the competing originalist interpreta-
tions of the Founders’ views on free exercise exemptions.  This
has distorted our understanding of these nineteenth-century texts
and has obscured their real value.
B. Competing Interpretations of the Original Understanding
At the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted, every state ex-
cept Connecticut had written guarantees of religious freedom
into their constitutions.21  Six of these used language very similar
to that eventually placed in the Federal Constitution, specifically
protecting the “exercise” of religion.22
Two important articles written in the 1980s argued that the
drafters of the Constitution believed “free exercise” implied a
right to free exercise exemptions.23  The arguments put forward
in these articles were refined and considerably supplemented in
1990 by Michael McConnell’s article, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion , which argued that
the Federal Free Exercise Clause was originally understood to
provide people with a right to exemptions, at least for “peace-
able” behavior.24  For the purposes of this Article, I, like many
others, will take McConnell’s article as an authoritative state-
ment of the pro-exemptions originalist position.25
McConnell began by noting that significant disagreement ex-
isted in the American colonies about the nature of religious free-
dom and, in particular, about whether people had a right to free
exercise exemptions.26  Among them, he admitted, was a view
that was derived from the writings of Locke and that was deeply
hostile to exemptions and promoted religious “toleration” rather
21 McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1455.
22 Id.
23 See  Adams & Emmerich, supra note 16; Smith, supra  note 16.
24 See  McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1511-13; cf.  Hamburger, supra  note 8, at 916
(“According to Professor McConnell, the Free Exercise Clause may have originally
been understood to exempt individuals from civil laws to which they had religious
objections.  In qualification, McConnell adds that the First Amendment may have
exempted only such noncompliance as was peaceable and did not threaten impor-
tant government interests.”).
25 See, e.g. , Bradley, supra  note 9, at 264 (“McConnell’s is the best originalist case
made as yet, and the best likely to be made in the near future . . . . If it is unpersua-
sive—as I contend that it is—then we may conclude that the conduct exemption
cannot be supported historically.”); Hamburger, supra  note 8, at 915-16 (arguing
that McConnell has superseded all previous articles advancing the notion that the
Founders understood free exercise clauses to provide a right to exemptions).
26 McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1421-73.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 10  9-MAR-07 8:56
378 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 369
than “freedom.”27  This view, he asserted, was associated with
figures who embraced a “religious republican” political philoso-
phy—one that insisted that a democracy could not survive unless
its citizens were imbued with virtue.28  McConnell argued, how-
ever, that by the time of the ratification of the Constitution, most
Americans were moving away from this philosophy and its
antiexemptions conclusion.  Prodded by evangelicals, the major-
ity of Americans had come to embrace a more liberal view on the
question of exemptions.29  To advance his argument, McConnell
looked to a number of sources, including the writings of Foun-
ders such as James Madison, “free exercise” clauses in state con-
stitutions, and the interpretation of those clauses by state courts
in the years before and after the adoption of the Federal Free
Exercise Clause.
The writings of Madison suggested to McConnell a strong sup-
port for the idea of exemptions, at least for peaceable behavior.30
McConnell also saw popular support for this position reflected in
the state constitutions that were drafted shortly after the Revolu-
tion.31  Some constitutions were drafted with free exercise lan-
guage that contained explicit caveats providing that the exercise
was protected only insofar as it did not permit citizens to violate
the welfare of the state.32  McConnell argued that these all re-
flected a desire to create a judicially enforceable right that would
prevent legislatures and executives from enacting and enforcing
laws that prevented people from engaging in peaceful religious
practice.  Although these provisions did not clearly define what
27 Id. at 1430-35.
28 Id.  at 1441.
29 See generally id.  at 1442-73.  For the role of evangelicals, see id.  at 1442-44.
McConnell admitted that some leading figures at the time of the Founding, including
Thomas Jefferson, continued to agitate against exemptions in Lockean terms. See
id.  at 1449-52.  Still, McConnell contended, there was an observable trend away
from this position and toward a competing liberal position allegedly promoted by
James Madison, which assumed that people’s natural right to freedom of religion
gave them a right to free exercise exemptions.  For McConnell’s interpretation of
Madison’s view, see id.  at 1452-54.
30 See id.  at 1452-55.
31 See id.  at 1455-66.
32 Nine constitutions precluded free exercise protection for behavior that would
violate the “peace” or safety of the state. Id.  at 1456-58 n.242 (discussing GA.
CONST. of 1777, art. LVI; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. V; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art.
XXXVIII).  McConnell also noted that Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, and South Carolina had prerevolutionary constitutions that
contained similar qualifications on their free exercise guarantees. See id.  at 1461 &
n.257.
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types of practice were to be considered “religious” or “peacea-
ble,” McConnell argued that they were not superfluous but must
have carried some meaning and protection.33  In other words,
Americans at the time of the framing must have believed that
judges could and should take final responsibility for determining
whether a law was too harmful to get an exemption.  To provide
further support for his reading, McConnell argued that some
early nineteenth-century state constitutional opinions implied
that free exercise clauses gave citizens a right to exemptions
while few precluded them.34
McConnell’s argument did not go unchallenged.  Ellis West,
Philip Hamburger, Gerard Bradley, and Kurt Lash have all writ-
ten important pieces questioning McConnell’s analysis and his
conclusions.35  McConnell’s critics have attacked nearly every as-
pect of his argument.  To begin, Philip Hamburger, Gerard Brad-
ley, and Kurt Lash all argued that McConnell failed to read
Madison’s writings on exemptions in their proper context and
thus exaggerated the degree to which these writings support the
idea of exemptions.36  They believed that Madison’s most famous
writings on religious freedom, writings that McConnell character-
ized as strongly pro-exemption, were in fact ambiguous and
could be reconciled with an antiexemptions posture.37
Hamburger argued that McConnell also misunderstood the im-
petus beyond the adoption of state constitutional guarantees of
free exercise.  According to Hamburger, free exercise clauses
were designed to protect, at most, the right to violate laws di-
rected at religion, i.e., laws that explicitly singled out particular
religious practices qua religious practices.38  They were not de-
signed to give citizens any right to violate laws of general applica-
33 See id.  at 1463.
34 See id.  at 1503-13.
35 See  Bradley, supra  note 9; Hamburger, supra  note 8; West, supra note 16, at
623-33; cf. Lash, supra  note 9, at 1127.
36 Bradley, supra  note 9, at 268-71; Hamburger, supra  note 8, at 926-29; Lash,
supra  note 9, at 1115-18.
37 Bradley, supra  note 9, at 268-71; Hamburger, supra  note 8, at 926-29; Lash,
supra  note 9, at 1115-18.
38 See  Hamburger, supra  note 8, at 948.  In particular, Hamburger stated:
[E]xamination of religious freedom in late eighteenth-century America
reveals that a constitutional right of religious exemption was not even an
issue in serious contention among the vast majority of Americans . . . .
[T]he politically active and influential dissenters who sought and obtained
expanded constitutional guarantees of religious liberty did not seek a gen-
eral constitutional right of exemption from civil laws.  Indeed, they ex-
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tion that a legislature, in its sole discretion, had enacted to
protect what it believed to be the social welfare.39  To this end,
Hamburger provided an alternate interpretation for the free ex-
ercise provisions in state constitutions and the public welfare ca-
veats that they included.  Hamburger argued that the drafters of
these provisions uniformly equated “peaceableness” with law-
abidingness.40  His argument rests, in part, on his conviction that
drafters of state constitutions in the late eighteenth century were
hostile to the judicial expansion of ambiguous language.  It was
unlikely, according to Hamburger, that the Founders would want
judges to have the power to determine on an ad hoc basis
whether an act was religious or peaceable.41  Similar to
Hamburger, Bradley agreed that those trying to understand the
implications of free exercise guarantees need to bear in mind that
eighteenth-century notions of acceptable judicial review were
very different from our own.42
In the face of such disputes,43 some scholars have asked
whether the eighteenth-century materials might be too ambigu-
ous to allow us to understand the original intent with any confi-
dence.44  Others have suggested that the texts are not ambiguous;
pressly disavowed such a right and frequently agitated for equal civil rights
and an absence of laws respecting religion.
Id.
39 See id.
40 Id.  at 922-23 (defining “individuals who disturbed the peace” as those “who
actually violated civil law”).  Hamburger provides evidence that some Americans
explicitly embraced an antiexemptions position, primarily from the writings of Prot-
estant ministers. Id.  at 918-19.  Unfortunately, the proffered evidence does not
make clear whether such an interpretation was generally adopted, or even whether
influential figures like Madison were among the people adopting this antiexemp-
tions position.
41 Id.  at 931 (arguing that the Founders believed “federal judges should not be left
with vague rules that might become sources of judicial discretion . . . [t]hus, it is
improbable that the framers and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights deliberately adopted a
balancing test as the standard of individual religious liberty and federal power”).
42 Bradley, supra  note 9, at 267-73.
43 Justices on the Supreme Court who have compared McConnell’s originalist in-
terpretation with those of his originalist critics have disagreed about which is more
convincing. Compare  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537-44 (1997) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part), with id.  at 548-64 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), and id.  at 565-66
(Souter, J., dissenting).
44 See, e.g. , Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case , 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1, 64 (2004); cf.  John F. Wilson, Original Intent and the Quest for Comparable Con-
sensus , in THE FIRST FREEDOM:  RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 114-15 (James
E. Wood ed., 1990).
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rather, they represent competing views about free exercise.45
According to this view, there was no consensus at the time of the
Founding regarding the question of exemptions.
Apparently anticipating this argument, originalists who be-
lieved there was a single shared understanding of the Free Exer-
cise Clause at the time of the Founding had already turned their
attention to nineteenth-century cases.
In his article, Michael McConnell had cited a number of early
nineteenth-century state exemption cases that indicated to him a
willingness on the part of judges to ask whether a certain type of
behavior was truly essential to a petitioner’s religious practice,
peaceable, and not seriously harmful to other citizens.  On the
basis of this analysis, he concluded that courts had occasionally
provided exemptions and that those that did not were clearly de-
parting from a “Madisonian” position requiring exemptions.46
McConnell’s critics found his claims to be wanting.  For example,
Gerard Bradley insisted that McConnell’s analysis of nineteenth-
century history was the weakest part of his argument.47  Accusing
McConnell of cherry-picking cases that support his position and
then of mischaracterizing those cases, Bradley argued that the
nineteenth-century legal tradition was unremittingly hostile to
the idea that citizens could get free exercise exemptions.48  Kurt
Lash agreed, although he treated the issue only briefly.  Like
Bradley, he saw cases and commentaries through the first half of
the century as overwhelmingly hostile to the idea that free exer-
cise clauses empowered judges to grant exemptions.49  Lash sug-
gested, however, that there was a change in attitudes toward
45 Steven D. Smith explained this position by stating:
[W]hile Americans may have concurred in endorsing the slogan “freedom
of conscience,” the agreement was largely verbal. . . . [T]o conclude from
this practice that consensus prevailed or even that the various antagonists
agreed “in principle” would be like concluding that proponents and oppo-
nents of abortion rights . . . are actually in essential agreement because they
all attempt to deploy the rhetoric of “choice.”
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE:  THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 40-41 (1995).
46 McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1513-17.
47 See  Bradley, supra  note 9, at 272-95.
48 See id. ; see also id.  at 307 (“McConnell’s historical methodology is perverse.
Within its own terms, his analysis is frequently arbitrary and his conclusions are
quite overdrawn. . . . [C]onduct exemptions cannot be squared with an originalist
account of constitutional law . . . [or] one hundred seventy years of faithful construc-
tion (the period from the Founding to Sherbert).”).
49 Lash, supra  note 9, at 1129-30.
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exemptions around the time of the Civil War.  He argued that,
whatever the Founders or nineteenth-century judges and lawyers
thought about the subject of free exercise, most leading Ameri-
cans at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that the
new amendment provided citizens of the United States with
some right to free exercise exemptions from state laws.50
This is where matters stood until Walter Walsh recently wrote
an article trying to resurrect the reputation of the long-neglected
nineteenth-century Irish-American lawyer William Sampson.
Walsh analyzed Sampson’s successful litigation on behalf of a
Catholic priest who wished to be exempted from the duty to tes-
tify about matters learned in the confessional.51  In his article,
Walsh argued that a case dismissed as insignificant by Bradley
and, to some extent by Lash, was actually quite influential.  In
demonstrating this, he identified some cases not discussed by
originalists or by Lash.52
In the next section, I will analyze the relevant cases and the
largely untapped body of nineteenth-century academic literature
discussing free exercise exemptions.  I will argue that nineteenth-
century texts reveal consistent disagreement about the meaning
of the free exercise guarantees found in the eighteenth-century
state constitutions and the Federal Constitution.  I will suggest
that it is hard to see these materials as supporting either the posi-
tion that late eighteenth-century Americans shared a common,
antiliberal interpretation of free exercise clauses or the position




One reason that historians have reached different conclusions
about nineteenth-century free exercise jurisprudence is that they
have looked at different materials.  Michael McConnell looked at
a fairly narrow range of cases, limited both by subject matter and
by time (stopping in 1848).53  He argued that these nineteenth-
50 Id.  at 1130-45.
51 See  Walsh, supra  note 44, at 52.
52 See id.  at 47 (pointing out that previous writers never disccused or, indeed,
seemed to be aware of Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 CAROLINA L.J. 202 (Union Dist.
S.C. 1827) or Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855)).
53 See  McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1503-13; see also  Bradley, supra  note 9, at 286
& n.221.
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century cases are “inconclusive” on the question of exemptions
and that, even if a number of cases reject the idea of exemptions,
these are poor indicators of the original understanding.54  In a
response, Gerard Bradley questioned McConnell’s narrow scope
of research, as well as McConnell’s interpretation of the cases.
Looking at a vast range of cases dealing with a wide range of
subjects and discussing cases deep into the nineteenth century,
Bradley argued that nineteenth-century courts were almost uni-
formly hostile to the idea that constitutional guarantees of free
exercise provided citizens with a right to free exercise.55  Kurt
Lash also looked at a wider range of cases than McConnell.  Like
Bradley, he found a tradition that was, at least at first, distinctly
hostile to any claim that free exercise clauses provided citizens
with a right to exemptions, although he saw American views of
free exercise exemptions grow more liberal over time.56
To some extent, McConnell and his critics have compared ap-
ples and oranges.  Furthermore, none of these authors systemati-
cally reviewed nineteenth-century case law on free exercise
exemptions, and none looked systematically at nineteenth-cen-
tury treatises.  In revisiting the nineteenth-century history as
presented in the articles of originalists, I see the issue as follows:
did nineteenth-century legal thinkers in the years prior to 1878
believe that constitutional provisions guaranteeing citizens the
right to free exercise of religion give citizens a right to be ex-
empted from state laws that directly compelled  them to act in a
way they believed God prohibited?  To answer this question, I
will look only at cases that address the question directly.  This
will lead me to look at more cases than McConnell, but fewer
than Bradley or Lash.  I also intend to show that our understand-
ing of these cases can be much enhanced by looking at treatises
that directly discuss the question of free exercise exemptions.57
However, I will narrow my focus to cases or treatises that discuss
the question of exemptions where there seemed to be an abso-
54 McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1513.
55 See  Bradley, supra  note 9, at 272-304.
56 See  Lash, supra note 9, at 1121-24, 1138-40.
57 My question asks only whether nineteenth-century Americans thought that free
exercise clauses allowed citizens whose religion was theistic to get an exemption.  I
am not sure that protections for “religion” extended merely to theistic religions, and
I do not believe that as a normative matter the clauses should be so constrained.
Nevertheless, with some misgivings, I am willing to focus on the limited question of
how nineteenth-century Americans applied free exercise clauses to holders of theis-
tic religious beliefs.
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lute conflict between state command and divine command—
cases where the state commands one thing, and the believer
thinks that God has commanded the opposite.  I understand that
this is not the only type of situation in which a citizen might plau-
sibly claim a free exercise exemption.  But I think they provide a
sample that gives us the most insight into the precise question at
issue.58
Furthermore, I should note that I am looking only at cases and
treatises published before 1878, the year that Reynolds v. United
States  was decided. Reynolds  is the first Supreme Court case
dealing with the issue of free exercise, and is a natural breaking
point in the intellectual history of free exercise exemptions.  Fur-
thermore, by breaking my study there, it allows me to make an
important point:  I believe nineteenth-century legal texts do not
provide much support for either of the two leading schools of
originalist thought, at least on the question of free exercise
clauses.  However, they do provide us with information that may
help us reexamine old assumptions about the meaning of Reyn-
olds and other early Supreme Court cases.  While I do not have
the space here to provide my own interpretation of Reynolds , I
58 Theoretically, one might also claim an exemption on the grounds of disparate
impact.  By this reasoning, a person could get an exemption from a generally appli-
cable law that is not designed to be discriminatory but still imposes a burden on her
not imposed on people with different religious beliefs. See, e.g. , Ex parte  Newman,
9 Cal. 502 (1858).  Exemptions based on disparate impact might be granted on the
ground that they constitute unlawful discrimination or an unconstitutional “estab-
lishment.” Id. at 510.
In some cases, one might also argue that the disproportionate burden functions as
a “punishment” for holding beliefs different than those of the majority.  Some nine-
teenth-century judges and academics recognized the possibility of free exercise ex-
emptions in the context of disproportionate burden.  However, cases of disparate
impact do not involve situations where a defendant’s religious conduct directly con-
flicts with state law.  Thus, they are imperfect indicators of judges’ and academics’
views on the specific question of free exercise exemptions in that context.  To ex-
amine nineteenth-century views on exemptions, I narrow my focus.  I look at cases
asking, for example, whether a Jewish citizen whose religion recognizes a Saturday
Sabbath can be compelled to give testimony on a Saturday.  I do not focus on the
case in which a merchant who closes a shop for religious reasons on Saturday can be
required to close his shop on a Sunday as well—something that he is not religiously
forbidden from doing, but which causes him economic harm that is amplified by his
religious beliefs.  I look at the latter type of case only to the extent that it helps us
understand vocabulary or concepts that appear in the former cases.
In short, in choosing materials to answer the question that I pose, I have tried to
isolate cases in which judges were faced with explicit demands for exemptions—or
at least explicitly discussed, in dicta, the subject—and treatises that explicitly ad-
dressed free exercise exemptions where a direct conflict exists between individual
religious belief and the requirements of law.
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will demonstrate the obvious relevance of nineteenth-century
cases and commentary to a study of these important opinions.
In short, by looking at free exercise materials written prior to
1878 that consider whether exemptions are ever appropriate
when religious belief conflicts with legally required action, we
can solve two goals at once.  First, we can determine whether
nineteenth-century legal materials support either of the two lead-
ing originalist interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause.  Sec-
ond, we can gather material that may eventually help us better
understand the seminal, and still crucially important, Supreme
Court opinion in Reynolds v. United States .
III
FREE EXERCISE THOUGHT IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
In the nineteenth century, state courts only occasionally had
the opportunity to hear cases involving claims for free exercise
exemptions of the precise type that concern us here.  Why they
heard so few is open to conjecture.  Perhaps there was agreement
on the proper spheres of church and state and a willingness on
the part of both the polity and the pious to respect those
spheres.59  Nevertheless, cases did occasionally appear.  There
were inevitably times when people disagreed about the boundary
between the two.  Thus, states threatened religious people with
prosecution for failing to abide by what the legislature had de-
clared to be a “civil” obligation, while defendants would claim
that the state was unconstitutionally violating their right of free
exercise by threatening to punish them for acting as their religion
commanded.
Nineteenth-century judges and commentators appear to have
universally accepted the general principle that religious citizens
could get exemptions from laws that prohibited behavior that
was simultaneously “religious,” “peaceable” and not harmful, in
any meaningful way, to other citizens.60  This is hardly surprising.
59 That answer was generally proposed in the middle of the nineteenth century by
the influential commentator Thomas Cooley.  He suggested that conflicts between
religious obligations and state legislatures were very sensitive to religious freedom
and thus tried to avoid imposing unacceptable obligations upon the pious. THOMAS
M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 477-78
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868).
60 See  discussion infra  Part III.B.
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Originalists seem to agree that the Founding generation em-
braced this broad principle.  Originalists disagree, however,
about whether this general free exercise principle was under-
stood as a practical matter to imply a right to free exercise ex-
emptions from generally applicable laws.  Ironically, each cites
nineteenth-century materials to support their argument.61  Revi-
siting the nineteenth-century materials, I argue that they do not
support either of the leading originalist positions.  One might
reasonably wonder if nineteenth-century opinions and commen-
taries can be trusted to accurately reflect the opinions of the
Founders.  Even assuming that they do, one cannot help but be
struck by the early appearance of disagreement about the ques-
tion of when, if ever, free exercise guarantees implied a right to
exemptions.  One is also struck by the fact that they continue
right up to the era of Reconstruction.  If anything, nineteenth-
century texts suggest nineteenth-century Americans inherited
from the Founders either confusion or disagreement about the
meaning of constitutional guarantees of free exercise and
whether they implied an individual right to free exercise
exemptions.
A. Freedom of Religious Belief and Speech
Nineteenth-century legal thinkers thought that American citi-
zens had a right not to be punished for their religious beliefs.
This is not in dispute.  It is not clear, however, that nineteenth-
century thinkers thought this right was grounded in the right to
free exercise.  At least one important thinker explicitly said it
was not and that free exercise clauses must thus protect some-
thing other than belief.
Francis Lieber was one of the most influential of the antebel-
lum legal commentators.  A German-trained political theorist,
Lieber held several important appointments in the United States
over the course of his career, including a professorship of law at
Columbia University.62  Historians have described him as the
most important American political scientist of the nineteenth
century,63 but his influence in legal circles was even more signifi-
61 For a description of McConnell’s position on the one hand, and Hamburger’s
on the other, see supra  Part I.B.
62 For a discussion of Lieber’s career, see infra  note 65.
63 SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION:  POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 140 (2002).  Even
more, Lieber is actually cited in the Reynolds  opinion itself.  98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
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cant.  His treatise Manual of Political Ethics  was enormously
popular with leading lawyers and judges,64 including Chancellor
Kent, Thomas Cooley, Justice Story, and later Supreme Court
justices.65  His subsequent treatise, On Civil Liberty and Self-
Government , became one of the leading treatises of the nine-
teenth century.66
In his Manual of Political Ethics , Lieber explicitly argued that
the right to believe what one chose was not  a right granted by
free exercise clauses.  It was simply a fact that governments could
not compel people to “think” in a certain way.67  Thus, he ar-
64 For example, Theodore Woolsey wrote a laudatory preface to the 1876 re-
printing of Lieber’s work, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS. See  Theodore D. Wool-
sey, Preface  to 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS 3, 3-5 (Theodore
D. Woolsey ed., 2d ed. rev., Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876) (1838).
65 Although Lieber is not a household name, his influence was enormous.  For
historical analyses of Lieber’s influential career, see, for example, Michael Herz,
Rediscovering Francis Lieber:  An Afterword and Introduction , 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2107 (1995); M. Russell Thayer, The Life, Character, and Writings of Francis
Lieber , in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER:  REMINISCENCES,
ADDRESSES, AND ESSAYS 13-44 (Daniel C. Gilman ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co.
1880).  Lieber’s influence on nineteenth-century judges and commentators has been
noted. See, e.g.,  Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in American
Law , 10 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 304 (1993) (“Lieber was recognized by his contem-
poraries, including James Kent and Joseph Story, as perhaps the premier legal aca-
demic of antebellum times.”); Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand
Juries? , 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 478 n.66 (1992) (describing Lieber as “one of the
most influential nineteenth-century commentators on the Constitution”); see also
FRANK FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER:  NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERAL 164-65 (1947)
(reporting Story’s and Kent’s praise of Lieber); Woolsey, supra  note 64 (offering a
nineteenth-century account of Lieber’s influence); David J. Barron, The Promise of
Cooley’s City:  Traces of Local Constitutionalism , 147 U. PA. L. REV.  487, 519
(1999) (noting Cooley’s citing of Lieber).
That Supreme Court justices saw Lieber as trustworthy on certain points is shown
by the fact that the Supreme Court, on a crucial point in the Reynolds  opinion, cited
Lieber for support. See  98 U.S. at 166 (“Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to
the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the
people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection
with monogamy.”).
Lieber’s work continues to be appreciated, as recognized by the Cardozo School
of Law in its 1995 symposium issue. See A Symposium on Legal and Political Her-
meneutics, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1879 (1995).
For some critical views of Lieber—noting the racist assumptions that are built into
his work—see JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY:  THE GEN-
EALOGY OF AN AMERICAN VOCATION 25-32 (1993); Bruce Burgett, On the Mormon
Question:  Race, Sex, and Polygamy in the 1850s and the 1990s , 57 AM. Q. 75, 82-85
(2005).
66 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (Phila., J.B. Lip-
pincott & Co. 1859).
67 LIEBER, supra note 64, at 189-90.
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gued, when constitutions are drafted to protect “freedom of con-
science,” the drafters must have been trying to protect something
more than the right to believe what they choose.  Instead, they
must have been protecting citizens’ right to act (or to refrain
from acting) in accordance with their beliefs without fear of pun-
ishment—subject to the generally accepted caveat that no act
could be exempted if it violated the public peace or otherwise
harmed other citizens.68  Lieber expanded this idea in On Civil
Liberty and Self-Government .69  Stressing that religious liberty
protected religious acts, he argued against the use of the term
“liberty of conscience.”  “Liberty of conscience, or, as it ought to
be called more properly, the liberty of worship, is one of the pri-
mordial rights of man, and no system of liberty can be considered
comprehensive which does not include guarantees for the free
exercise of this right.”70
It is not clear how many nineteenth-century thinkers conceptu-
alized constitutional guarantees of freedom of belief in the same
way as Lieber.  However, nineteenth-century judges and com-
mentators appear to have agreed with Lieber that free exercise
guarantees protected at least some  types of worshipful action
that were regulated by civil legislation.71  If nothing else, judges
and academics seemed to agree that free exercise guarantees pro-
tected, among other things, the right to proselytize and to engage
in religious disputation.72
The right to free exercise exemptions from laws banning relig-
ious speech was primarily discussed in the nineteenth century in
the context of blasphemy prosecutions.  There currently appears
to be some question about whether the study of exemptions from
68 As Lieber explained:
[L]iberty of conscience has no meaning. . . . We might as well say liberty of
taste.  How can the state reach my taste? . . . Facts and outward actions are
the only things for which the state has an organ; how, then, can it approach
the thoughts and feelings? . . .
It is otherwise with the publicly professed creeds, modes of worship, and
churches . . . . These are tangible by the state; they can claim protection if
innocuous, or may be interfered with if they interfere with the jural rela-
tions of others—for instance, if they should palpably promote immorality.
Id. See also LIEBER, supra  note 66, at 99.
69 See  Guyora Binder, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2169, 2172 (1995) (describing On
Civil Liberty and Self-Government  as “the leading American political science text-
book of the nineteenth century”).
70 LIEBER, supra  note 66, at 99 (footnotes omitted).
71 See  discussion and cases cited infra  Parts III.B.1-2.
72 See  discussion and cases cited infra  Part III.B.1.
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blasphemy laws is relevant to a study of exemptions from civil
law.  Michael McConnell has argued that blasphemy prosecu-
tions were laws directed at religion by prohibiting religious lan-
guage on grounds that it was religiously false.73  Thus, to his
mind, they did not raise the question of exemptions.  Gerard
Bradley has vigorously disputed this point.74  As Bradley cor-
rectly noted, nineteenth-century Americans thought that laws
criminalizing the dissemination of false beliefs because they were
false were properly characterized as laws against “heresy,” and it
was agreed that they could not withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.75  Blasphemy laws were considered permissible insofar as
they were civil regulations restricting speech deemed likely to
disturb the peace and welfare of society.76  The harm prohibited
by these laws was not merely the harm of polluting people’s mo-
rality, sapping their virtue and leading to bad behavior.  These
laws also sought to avoid the danger of offending people so
gravely that they might riot.77
Thus far Bradley appears to be correct.  However, Bradley is
not correct to say that the successful prosecution of blasphemy
necessarily suggests that Americans in the early years of the Re-
public were unwilling to contemplate the possibility of exemp-
tions.  Quite to the contrary, if one reads the cases closely, they
suggest that Americans believed judges were required to grant
exemptions under some circumstances.
As a general rule, nineteenth-century free speech jurispru-
dence subordinated speech to the concerns of social well-being.
That is to say, speech was free so long as it did not cause harm to
society.78  In applying this principle, courts generally deferred to
the legislature’s definition of what was harmful, even when the
73 McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1503.
74 Bradley, supra  note 9, at 274.
75 See  discussion infra  in this Part III.A and infra  notes 80-87; cf.  Bradley, supra
note 9, at 274-75.
76 See  discussion infra  in this Part III.A, particularly the discussion accompanying
notes 77-87; cf. COOLEY, supra  note 59, at 471-72; Bradley, supra  note 9, at 275-77.
77 See  State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 553 (1837) (“In general, an offence
which outrages the feelings of the community so far as to endanger the public peace,
may be prohibited by the legislature . . . .”); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg.
& Rawle 394, 407 (Pa. 1824) (“It is open, public vilification of the religion of the
country that is punished, not to force conscience by punishment . . . and not as a
restraint upon the liberty of conscience; but licentiousness, endangering the public
peace . . . .”).
78 David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years , 90 YALE L.J.
514, 539-40 (1981).  For a slightly different analysis, see Michael T. Gibson, The Su-
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harm was defined in “moral” terms.79  Blasphemous speech was
harmful in the short term in that it could provoke civil distur-
bances and in the long term because it was liable to sap the pub-
lic morality and lead to long-term social ills.80  To avoid a
prosecution for criticizing Christian beliefs, therefore, a person
had to plead a special constitutional right that prevented him
from being punished for this type of otherwise punishable
speech.  One approach was to ask for a free exercise exemption
from antiblasphemy laws.
In all of the reported blasphemy cases prior to the Civil War,
judges refused to grant an exemption to the defendants at bar.
As we shall see shortly, though, the opinions in these cases made
clear that their authors envisioned circumstances in which ex-
emptions would have to be granted.81
preme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917 , 55 FORDHAM L. REV.
263 (1986).
79 Federal courts consistently upheld congressional restrictions of speech, includ-
ing censorship of the mail.  In one of the early cases defining the reach of the Com-
merce Clause, the Supreme Court held that the post office could refrain from
delivering materials “injurious to the public morals.” Ex parte  Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,
736 (1877).  The Court justified the exclusion of lottery tickets by what it considered
reference to the federal government’s unquestioned right to prevent the use of “its
facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals.” Id.
After the Civil War, the Court held that people who attempted to send materials
injurious to the public morals through the mail could face criminal liability.  See, e.g. ,
Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420, 424 (1896).  So too, the Court consistently
upheld injunctions against union leaders speaking to further their cause. See, e.g. ,
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 261-62 (1917); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 436-37 (1911).
80 Concerns about the short- and long-term effects of blasphemous speech on
public order are revealed in, inter alia, Chandler , 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 553 (“In gen-
eral, an offence which outrages the feelings of the community so far as to endanger
the public peace, may be prohibited by the legislature. . . .”); and Updegraph , 11
Serg. & Rawle at 407 (stating that blasphemy is punished “not as a restraint upon
the liberty of conscience; but licentiousness, endangering the public peace”).  Also,
the court in Chandler  stated:
If the violation of decorum here mentioned, be so flagrant as to endanger
the peace of society, the principle of law thus limited and expressed is one,
which had it been engrafted into the civil institutions of other countries,
would have superseded the necessity of revolutionizing their governments
with every change or reformation in religion; and rivers of blood which
have been poured out in the conflicts of contending factions, might thus
have been spared to mankind.
2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 572.
81 See  Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 154 (1844); Chandler , 2 Del.
(2 Harr.) at 560-70; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811);
Updegraph , 11 Serg. & Rawle at 405.  For a discussion of these cases, see discussion
infra  Part III.A, particularly that of Chandler , which states that people cannot be
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A look at the actual cases and treatises makes clear that legal
experts agreed that people who felt religiously compelled to dis-
pute mainstream Christian beliefs could be granted a free exer-
cise exemption from blasphemy laws so long as their words were
not “malicious,” which apparently meant that they took care to
make their (inevitably offensive) words as inoffensive as possi-
ble.82  Thus, while it is true that alleged blasphemers were con-
victed in the four reported cases in which free exercise
exemptions from blasphemy laws were requested, judges care-
fully explained their refusals to grant exemptions as decisions
based on the particular facts of the cases.83  Stressing the wanton
and unnecessarily offensive language that the speakers had used,
judges strongly suggested that free exercise exemptions would  be
granted from otherwise valid laws restricting speech if the speech
at issue could reasonably be characterized as bona fide,
nonincendiary religious disputation or proselytization.
For example, in New York Chancellor Kent presided over a
case that explored whether the free exercise provision of the
New York State Constitution84 required the government to ex-
empt citizens from blasphemy laws in certain situations.  He con-
cluded that blasphemy prosecutions were prohibited unless  the
speech was uttered, as in the case at bar, “with a wicked and
malicious disposition, and not in a serious discussion upon any
controverted point in religion.”85  Similarly, one Pennsylvania
state court judge rejected a constitutional challenge to a blas-
phemy prosecution.  But this was only because he understood the
law to exempt people from prosecution for good-faith, nonmali-
cious religious disputation and thus satisfy the constitutional re-
quirement of free exercise.  Regarding the right of free exercise
itself, the judge stated:
prosecuted for carrying out acts of disputation or proselytization.  In Constitutional
Limitations , Cooley explains that this is because it imposes on his rights of free
exercise. COOLEY, supra note 59, at 470.  Reviewing the relevant cases, Cooley ex-
plained that they were based on the assumption that “[a]n earnest believer usually
regards it his duty to propagate his opinions.  To deprive him of this right is to take
from him the power to perform what he considers a most sacred obligation.” Id.
82 See  discussion infra  Part III.A, particularly the discussions of Ruggles ,
Updegraph , and Chandler  accompanying notes 84-88 and the discussion of treatises
accompanying notes 89-91.
83 See  discussion infra  Part III.A, particularly the discussions of Ruggles ,
Updegraph , and Chandler  and accompanying notes 84-88.
84 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. 38.
85 Ruggles , 8 Johns. at 292; cf. Chandler , 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 577-78.
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[N]o author . . . who fairly and conscientiously promulgates
the opinions with whose truths he is impressed, for the benefit
of others, is answerable as a criminal . . . .  [A] malicious and
mischievous intention is, in such a case, the broad boundary
between right and wrong, . . . it is to be collected from the
offensive levity, scurrilous and opprobrious language, and
other circumstances, whether the act of the party was mali-
cious . . . .86
A Delaware court in 1837 characterized the issue as one of
acting in a way that breached the peace.  It was unequivocal that
courts must be prepared to grant constitutional free exercise ex-
emptions in cases where there was no imminent threat of
violence:
We have endeavored to mark down the length, width, height
and depth, of the only principle upon which, as we think, blas-
phemy can be punished under our state constitution.  We
again repeat, that the only legitimate end of the prosecution is
to preserve the public peace.  It is sometimes said that our
courts are the conservators of morals.  This is true just so far as
a breach of morals may necessarily tend to a breach of the
peace, and no further.87
Consistently, then, courts expressed an implicit willingness to
grant a judicial exemption if states prohibited religious speech
that was best characterized as nonmalicious, nonscurrilous
86 Updegraph , 11 Serg. & Rawle at 405; cf. Chandler , 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 577-78
(following Updegraph).
87 Chandler , 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 574.  Also, the court cited, with approval, the
following statement:
“[A]ny one may profess or oppose any doctrine, provided he inculcates his
principles, whether orally or in writing, in such manner as not to commit a
flagrant violation of decorum; what acts or words will constitute such an
outrage must evidently depend upon the state of society .”  If the violation of
decorum here mentioned, be so flagrant as to endanger the peace of soci-
ety, the principle of law thus limited and expressed is one, which had it
been engrafted into the civil institutions of other countries, would have su-
perseded the necessity of revolutionizing their governments with every
change or reformation in religion; and rivers of blood which have been
poured out in the conflicts of contending factions, might thus have been
spared to mankind.
Id.  at 572.
Furthermore, the court stressed that the protections afforded for speech naturally
applied to any religious undertaking for religious reasons and not threatening immi-
nent harm to others. Id.  at 577 n.(a) (“It would not be difficult to mention customs
and manners, as well as principles, which have a tendency unfavorable to society;
and which, nevertheless, cannot be restrained by penal laws, except with the total
destruction of civil liberty.”) (quoting Letter from Dr. Furneaux to Justice
Blackstone).
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disputation.88
Treatise writers affirmed that constitutional guarantees of free
exercise provided citizens with the right to engage in religious
disputation and proselytize vigorously.  In upholding a blas-
phemy prosecution as a breach of the peace, a Delaware court
explicitly cited the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia Americana ,
edited by Lieber and contributed to by Justice Story.89  The court
interpreted the encyclopedia to state that blasphemy prosecu-
tions were only permitted to prevent speech that was calculated
toward or reckless of the incitement of violence.90  It is a staple
of later treatises that people have a right to dispute or proselytize
88 A similar position appeared in dictum in a Supreme Court case by Justice Story
that did not, strictly speaking, involve a blasphemy claim.  In 1844, the Court heard a
case arising under Pennsylvania law that challenged a bequest creating a school that
banned any cleric or other religious official from its grounds.  Vidal v. Girard’s
Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 133 (1844).  The bequest was challenged as an insult to
Christianity. Id.  at 143-44.  Justice Story, writing for the Court, admitted that under
the common law, such a bequest would be prohibited.  However, he said, the adop-
tion of a free exercise clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution had created a right to
state one’s beliefs so long as it was done without malice, stating their objections to
Christianity in the most sensitive possible way. Id.  at 154.  The right of free exercise
“must have been intended to extend equally to all sects, whether they believed in
Christianity or not, and whether they were Jews or infidels.” Id.  at 198.
Therefore, according to Justice Story:
[A]lthough Christianity [was] part of the common law of the state, yet it is
so in this qualified sense, that its divine origin and truth are admitted, and
therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed
against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public.
Id.
89 Chandler , 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 572.
90 In Chandler , the court stated:
In the second volume of the Encyclopedia Americana , by Leiber [sic], p.
130, it is remarked by a writer on blasphemy, “viewing this subject in a
philosophical, religious, or political view, it would be difficult to lay down
any general principles applicable to different states of society; but the pre-
vailing opinion on this subject in the United States, and that to which the
laws and opinions of other countries are strongly tending, is, that any one
may profess or oppose any doctrine, provided he inculcates his principles,
whether orally or in writing, in such manner as not to commit a flagrant
violation of decorum; what acts or words will constitute such an outrage
must evidently depend upon the state of society .”  If the violation of deco-
rum here mentioned, be so flagrant as to endanger the peace of society, the
principle of law thus limited and expressed is one, which had it been en-
grafted into the civil institutions of other countries, would have superseded
the necessity of revolutionizing their governments with every change or
reformation in religion; and rivers of blood which have been poured out in
the conflicts of contending factions, might thus have been spared to
mankind.
Id .
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in favor of their religious views so long as they do not do so in a
way likely to lead to public disturbance.91
In short, nineteenth-century American lawyers seemed to
agree that the right to free exercise granted citizens not only the
right to believe anything they chose, but also some judicially en-
forceable right to act on the basis of that belief.  If nothing else, it
gave them a qualified to right to engage in otherwise illegal relig-
ious disputation or proselytization.92  Religious expression was
protected so long as it was not “malicious” and thus the type of
speech that would predictably lead to breaches of peace.  But did
it give them something more than a right to speak about their
beliefs?
Justice O’Connor has recently suggested that cases involving
91 Edward Mansfield wrote in 1845, “What is called the rights of conscience would
be very difficult of definition in words, but the practice in the United States has
given it a very clear exposition.  It is the right to believe , to utter  what is believed and
to worship according to that belief.” EDWARD D. MANSFIELD, THE LEGAL RIGHTS,
LIABILITIES AND DUTIES OF WOMEN 147 (Salem, Mass., John P. Jewett & Co. 1845).
Thomas Cooley, in his influential nineteenth-century treatise on constitutional
law, suggested that constitutions limit the state’s ability to prosecute blasphemy.
COOLEY, supra note 59, at 470-71.  Cooley suggested that constitutional guarantees
of free exercise require exemptions for more than belief.  At a minimum, they re-
quire exemptions from laws prohibiting people from expressing and propagating
one’s religious beliefs:  “An earnest believer usually regards it his duty to propagate
his opinions.  To deprive him of this right is to take from him the power to perform
what he considers a most sacred obligation.” Id.  at 470.
Thus, with respect to blasphemy convictions,
[a] bad motive must exist; there must be a wilful and malicious attempt to
lessen men’s reverence for the Deity, or for the accepted religion.  But
outside of such wilful and malicious attempt, there is a broad field for can-
did investigation and discussion. . . . The constitutional provisions for the
protection of religious liberty . . . guarantee to every one a perfect right to
form and to promulgate such opinions and doctrines upon religious matters
. . . as to himself shall seem just.
Id.  at 474-75.
Joseph Thompson’s 1873 treatise on church and state jurisprudence cited Cooley
for the proposition that “the following things are not lawful in any of the States of
the American Union . . . ‘(4) restraints upon free exercise’ [and] ‘(5) [r]estraints
upon the expression of religious belief.’” JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH AN APPENDIX ON THE GERMAN POPULATION
15 (Boston, James R. Osgood & Co. 1873).
92 It is open to question whether such a doctrine in fact provided much protection
for those who insulted the religious sensibilities of a majority.  One would not, of
course, wish to be naive.  The principle that nonmalicious, “serious,” “religious” dis-
putation was protected is not easy to apply in practice, and it is difficult to see how it
could be applied in an objective manner.  Inquiries into sincerity of belief can easily
lapse into a question of “plausibility” of belief.  Furthermore, a question about
whether a religious point at issue is one “in serious” dispute leaves considerable
room for judges’ own religious beliefs to influence their decisions.
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religious speech were always thought to be sui generis.93  On its
face, it is not implausible to think that this might be so.94  How-
ever, as we shall see, it is not clear that nineteenth-century
Americans held this position, or even that most did.  As noted
above, one court, in describing constitutional limits on blas-
phemy prosecutions, stressed that these protections stretched not
just to the expression of opinions but to all religious “manners
and customs.”95  As I will show in the next section, an examina-
tion of case law and treatises discussing exemptions for actions
other than speech suggests that some American judges and com-
mentators believed exemptions were for all practical purposes
unavailable for actions other than religious speech.  From an
early period, however, other judges and commentators were per-
fectly willing to contemplate the possibility of exemptions from
civil laws that regulated actions other than speech—and in some
cases to suggest that they were required.
B. Nineteenth-Century Court Cases Dealing with Exemptions
Outside the Area of Speech
Those who seek the American judicial understanding of free
exercise in the years prior to 1878 must focus on the opinions of
state courts interpreting state constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing the rights of conscience.96 In the 1833 opinion Barron v.
93 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
94 Kurt Lash has suggested that Madison’s embrace of exemptions was far less
significant than it appeared because he believed that religion and the state were
sovereign in separate spheres.  Lash, supra  note 9, at 1114-17.  Assuming this were
true, blasphemy might conceivably represent an exceedingly unusual area in which
laws enacted under the police powers of the state might actually encroach on behav-
ior that everyone accepted as “religious.”
95 The Delaware Supreme Court cited this letter to Justice Blackstone:
The distinction between the tendency of principles, and the overt acts
arising from them is, and cannot but be, observed in many cases of a civil
nature, in order to determine the bounds of the magistrate’s power, or at
least to limit the exercise of it, in such cases.  It would not be difficult to
mention customs and manners, as well as principles, which have a tendency
unfavorable to society; and which, nevertheless, cannot be restrained by
penal laws, except with the total destruction of civil liberty.
Chandler , 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 576-77 n.(a) (quoting Letter from Dr. Furneaux to
Justice Blackstone).
96 In several of these cases, state courts discuss not only the proper construction of
the state’s own free exercise clause, but also the Federal Free Exercise Clause.  Such
discussions are, however, aberrant. See  Walsh, supra  note 44, at 43 (discussing cases
including People v. Philips  and Commonwealth v. Cronin).
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Baltimore , the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment did not limit the power of state governments.97
Twelve years later, the Court in Permoli v. Municipality No. 1
declined to hear a claim that the free exercise clause of the U.S.
Constitution gave a citizen a right to a free exercise exemption
from a state law.98  Very few federal laws presented a clear ques-
tion of free exercise exemptions.  Indeed, it was not until Reyn-
olds  in 1878 that the Supreme Court heard and decided a request
for a free exercise exemption from a federal statute.
Given the limited number of state court cases dealing with ex-
emptions of the type that we are concerned with in this Article,99
it is striking that contemporary academics have come to such dif-
ferent conclusions about nineteenth-century judicial attitudes to-
ward exemptions.100  Some originalists have read the cases as
unremittingly antiliberal, with the vast majority of judges cate-
gorically unwilling to contemplate free exercise exemptions.101
Others argue that the tradition is ambiguous and arguably consis-
tent with a liberal view.102  Kurt Lash has tried to reconcile the
competing views by arguing that the tradition moved from unre-
mittingly antiliberal to generally liberal.103  However, as I read
the state law cases, judges appear from the start to have been
deeply divided over the question of whether free exercise guar-
antees permit judges occasionally to grant exemptions, and they
remained divided right up to the time that Reynolds  was
decided.104
97 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250 (1833).
98 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609-10 (1845).
99 See  discussion supra  Part III.A, particularly the text accompanying notes 84-88
and infra  in this Part III.B, particularly the text accompanying notes 110-49.
100 See  discussion infra Part IV; cf.  discussion supra  Part I.B, particularly the text
accompanying notes 46-52.
101 See Bradley, supra note 9, at 272-95, 307.
102 See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1513-17.
103 See Lash, supra note 9, at 1129-45.
104 Only Walter Walsh, in his study of the different reactions to one New York
exemptions case, has fully embraced the idea that there might be so many differ-
ences among jurists of a single generation that one cannot reduce the tradition to
“generally liberal” or “generally antiliberal.” See  Walsh, supra  note 44, at 67-70.
Why he is alone is not clear.  One wonders whether the case law has not tempted
some to read it to support their preferred view.
Unlike McConnell, Bradley, or to some extent, Lash, Walsh did not come to the
material vested in a particular view of nineteenth-century jurisprudence.  His article
grew out of research into the importance of the influential Irish lawyer and activist
William Sampson, who was an advocate in a case where exemptions were granted.
In determining whether Sampson’s work had any influence, Walsh determined that
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In looking at cases dealing with free exercise exemptions, both
those dealing with religious speech and those dealing with non-
speech acts, it is helpful to bear in mind T. Alexander
Aleinikoff’s important insight that the nineteenth century was
not an age in which judges liked to engage in balancing tests.105
In distinguishing between acts that were constitutionally pro-
tected or unprotected, judges “generally recognized differences
in kind, not degree.”106  A determination might be based on in-
strumental considerations, but judges still described acts in cate-
gorical terms.  Their language suggests that, when faced with a
claim of constitutional right to engage in activities, society must
always be prepared to tolerate certain types of harm and need
never tolerate other types.  This is certainly true in the blas-
phemy cases discussed above.  When it came to religiously moti-
vated speech acts, judges made clear that all disputation that was
not malicious fell into the category of protected activity because
it did not tend to provoke breaches of the peace.  Malicious dis-
putation was always unprotected because it did tend to do so.107
The question that must be considered is whether, outside the
area of speech, the set of illegal acts that society must tolerate on
grounds of religious liberty was, in essence, a null set.  On this
question, judges, academics, and legislators apparently disagreed.
Rhetorically, jurists continued to assert that free exercise rights
must protect action—not just religious acts of speech, but any
“religious” acts that were peaceable and not harmful to others.
Almost as soon as they were asked to apply this principle to con-
crete cases, however, they seemed to disagree about what types
of nonspeech acts should be considered “religious” and about
some courts adopted Sampson’s view and that Sampson helped define the terms by
which jurists, liberal and antiliberal alike, discussed the question of free exercise.
See id.  at 40-49.
105 See  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing , 96
YALE L.J. 943, 949-63 (1987).
106 Id.  at 949.
107 As seen in the cases cited supra  Part III.A, nineteenth-century courts hearing
blasphemy convictions seemed to agree that challenging Christian scriptures was
presumptively harmful but that, on the other hand, it was a burden on pious individ-
uals not to be able to dispute or proselytize in favor of their religious views.  Instead
of balancing on a case-by-case basis the relative interests of the society and individ-
ual in particular cases, courts tried to come up with a rule that challenges to Chris-
tian beliefs had to be tolerated so long as it was made in a nonscurrilous or
nonmalicious fashion.  Scurrilous and malicious criticism of Christianity was pre-
sumed always to lead to a breach of the peace.  Nonscurrilous, nonmalicious speech
was presumed not to.
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how courts should understand the caveat that nonpeaceable or
socially harmful acts were ineligible for exemptions.108
However, as I will show shortly, some courts assumed that be-
havior that fell within the general police powers of the state was,
by definition, nonreligious and thus outside the scope of pro-
tected activity.  Alternatively, they argued that the act of law-
breaking was, by definition, “nonpeaceable” and socially
harmful.  I consider both of these approaches to make up the
“antiliberal” positions which automatically precluded the grant
of exemptions.
Other courts, however, took what I call a “liberal” position.
They accepted that behavior violating the civil law could be char-
acterized as both religious and peaceable and thus could be ex-
empted from generally applicable law.  They defined “religious”
behavior as action that a person sincerely believed formed a part
of his duty to honor God and God’s law.  Once behavior fit into
this category, they asked separately whether it was the type of act
that should be characterized as peaceable, and thus eligible for
exemption.  In determining where an act fell into the typology,
the analysis, including the factors considered, seemed murky.
Courts did not propose an objective principle to distinguish be-
tween activity that could and could not be exempted.  Rather,
they merely gave examples of peaceable activity that was eligible
for an exemption and nonpeaceable activity that was not.109
1. The Antiliberal Tradition
As we have already seen above, at least one blasphemy opin-
ion suggested the possibility that exemptions could be granted—
not just in speech but perhaps in other areas.  Furthermore, as I
will discuss in the next section, courts as early as 1813 had
108 Some early cases on free exercise were ambiguous on the question of exemp-
tions.  For example, in Massachusetts, the one free exercise case on record before
the Civil War is short and ambiguous.  In Commonwealth v. Drake , the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts was asked to void the conviction of a man who
claimed his conscience had compelled him to confess to the members of his church
his complicity in a crime.  15 Mass. (Tyng) 161, 161 (1818).  Strictly speaking, this
case does not count as the type of case I have tried to focus on—one where the state
prohibits an act that the conscience requires.  Here, the state “punishment” follows
indirectly, though inevitably, from the act.  In any case the court refused, but did not
give its reasons.
109 Courts frequently included polygamy among the examples of activities that
could not be exempted.
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granted exemptions outside the area of speech.110  Disturbed by
the reasoning in these cases and by the implications of judges
granting exemptions on an ill-defined and ad hoc basis, a group
of judges went out of their way to articulate and promote “anti-
liberal” approaches to free exercise.  Without rejecting outright
the principle that exemptions could be granted, they qualified it
out of existence.  Some defined “religious” behavior so narrowly
that it was impossible for any member of a minority religion to
receive a judicial exemption.111  Others defined peaceableness or
harmfulness in such a way that most or all illegal activity would
have to be deemed nonpeaceable or by its very nature unaccept-
ably harmful and thus preventable on grounds of necessity.112
Although South Carolina’s courts went back and forth on the
question of exemptions, the high court of South Carolina initially
embraced an antiliberal application of free exercise exemptions.
In State v. Willson , the Constitutional Court of South Carolina
accepted in principle that people should be permitted to get free
exercise exemptions for harmless religious behavior.  At the
same time, the Court qualified the principle out of existence.113
Fretting that the principle could be susceptible to abuse, the
judge defined “religion” with absurd narrowness as a faith that
preached obedience to duly enacted state law.114  Tautologically
precluding anyone from claiming that they wanted to engage in
110 See  discussion infra  Part III.B.2.
111 One went to the absurd length of defining “religious” behavior as behavior
commanded by any religion that required its adherents to obey the laws of their
nation.  Fretting that any doctrine of exemptions could be abused by “hypocritical”
and “deceitful” members of society who would create bogus religions merely to
avoid the operation of the law, a South Carolina judge opined that the drafters of
the state’s free exercise clause must have wanted judges to grant religious exemp-
tions only to members of a “true religion.”  How will a court recognize a true relig-
ion?  Simple—all “true religions” require “a ready obedience to the laws of the
country.”  State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 393, 395-96 (1823) (discussed in
the following paragraphs). See also  Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F. Cas. 1036, 1041
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 16,865).  In Van Metre  the court stated:
Some men of disordered understanding or perverted conscience may con-
ceive it a religious duty to break the law . . . . [I]f his opinions, ceasing to be
speculative, have ended in conduct, let no morbid sympathy—no false re-
spect for pretended “rights of conscience”—prevent either court or jury
from judging him justly . . . .
Id.
112 See  Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155, 160-63 (Pa. 1828) (Gib-
son, C.J., dissenting) and other cases discussed in this Part III.
113 Willson , 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) at 395.
114 Id. ; see also  McConnell, supra note 8, at 1510-11; Walsh, supra note 44, at 264.
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an illegal religious act, the court refused to exempt a member of
the Christian “Covenanter” sect from his obligation to serve as a
grand juror.115  As we shall see, the court later reversed itself,
taking a more expansive view of “religion” and a more skeptical
view about the legislature’s ability to identify a “harmful” act.116
Initially, Pennsylvania constitutional cases involving free exer-
cise were resolved without the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pro-
viding any clear explanation of its reasoning.117  In the 1828
opinion of Commonwealth v. Lesher , however, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court revisited the question of free exercise and ap-
pears to have flirted with a liberal posture.118  In response, Jus-
tice Gibson dissented and thereafter took every possible
opportunity, whether in holding or in dicta, to argue for an anti-
exemptions position.119
Gibson’s assault on liberal approaches to free exercise began
with his dissent in Lesher , where the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court heard a state constitutional challenge to the tradition of
striking prospective jurors in capital cases if such jurors were re-
ligiously opposed to the death penalty.120  Although the case did
not actually deal with an exemption in the narrow sense as this
Article uses it, the majority opinion could be read to suggest that
exemptions might in some cases be appropriate.  Certainly, this is
the way that Justice Gibson read the opinion, and, in an impas-
sioned dissent, he felt compelled to explain that exemptions
could never be granted under his interpretation of free exer-
115 Willson , 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) at 396.
116 See  Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 CAROLINA L.J. 202, 213 (Union Dist. S.C.
1830).  For this case, see discussion infra  in this Part III.B.1.
117 See  Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48, 49-51 (Pa. 1817); Stansbury v.
Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213, 213 (Pa. 1793).  In Wolf , a Jewish merchant argued that
a law prohibiting him from working on Sunday was contrary to his religious beliefs,
which required him to observe Saturday as the Sabbath rather than Sunday.  3 Serg.
& Rawle at 48-50.  The court rejected his claim on the basis that Jewish law did not
require the merchant to work on Sunday, and therefore the law did not cause him to
violate his religious duty. Id.  at 50-51.  It is unclear whether the court, in liberal
fashion, accepted the “religiousness” of the claim and balanced independently the
infringement of the individual right of free exercise against the public’s right to wel-
fare. Cf.  McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1507.
118 See  discussion of Commonwealth v. Lesher , infra  in this Part III.B.1 and notes
117-20.
119 See, e.g. , Simon’s Ex’rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831); Lesher , 17 Serg.
& Rawle 155, 160-64 (Pa. 1828) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).  These cases are discussed
infra  in this Part III.B.1 and notes 117-23.
120 17 Serg. & Rawle 155, 160-64 (Pa. 1828) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
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cise.121  Tellingly, Gibson accepted the principle that the right to
free exercise implies a right to receive judicial exemptions from
generally applicable laws so long as the act in question could not
be presumed harmful to society:
It is declared in the constitution (Art. ix., sect. 3) that “no
human authority can, in any case, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience .”  But what are those rights?  Simply a
right to worship the Supreme Being according to the dictates
of the heart; to adopt any creed or hold any opinion whatever
on the subject of religion; and to do, or forbear to do, any act,
for conscience sake, the doing or forbearing of which, is not
prejudicial to the public weal .122
Gibson worried, however, that this generally accepted princi-
ple was prone to abuse by unscrupulous people or credulous
judges.  Thus, in determining whether an act was presumptively
harmful and thus ineligible for exemptions, he suggested that:
(1) judges should defer to the legislature’s judgment and con-
clude that any act harmful enough to be banned by legislators
was too harmful for judges to permit on grounds of conscience;
and (2) judges should take care not to accept too quickly the as-
sertion that obedience to a law was inconsistent with a claimant’s
perceived religious obligations.123  Accordingly, Gibson thought
the court should hold that, notwithstanding the guarantee of a
person’s right to worship, society’s “right to interfere, on princi-
ples of self-preservation, is not disputed.  And this right is insolv-
able into the most absolute necessity; for, were the laws
dispensed with, wherever they happened to be in collision with
some supposed religious obligation , government would be per-
petually falling short of the exigence.”124
In short, Justice Gibson was not prepared to challenge outright
the basic premise that the right to free exercise implied a right
sometimes to be exempted on grounds of conscience from an
otherwise applicable, duly enacted law.  Nevertheless, he feared
deeply that the right to exemptions, if construed too broadly,
could lead to a breakdown of order.  Thus, he concluded, courts
should define the scope of religious exercise exceedingly nar-
rowly and the scope of nonpeaceable behavior extremely
broadly.
121 Id.
122 Id.  at 160.
123 Id. at 161-63.
124 Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
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In dicta in the 1831 case of Simon’s Executors v. Gratz , Justice
Gibson again felt compelled to argue for a highly restrictive defi-
nition of religion and a deferential attitude toward the legisla-
ture’s designation of an act as harmful.125 Gratz  involved a
Jewish man who had brought a civil action but refused to attend
court on Saturday.  The court punished him by dismissing his
case.  In response, he challenged the dismissal for several rea-
sons, including that as an observant Jew, Pennsylvania’s constitu-
tional guarantee of free exercise gave him the right to be
exempted from an order to appear in court on Saturday.  In
pressing the petitioner’s case, counsel brought to the court’s at-
tention a case in which a New York court had taken a liberal
interpretation of a free exercise clause and had, indeed, granted
an exemption.126  Justice Gibson overturned the dismissal, but
not on the free exercise grounds that had been pled.  Indeed, he
indulged in a lengthy dictum criticizing the New York decision
and all “liberal” interpretations of free exercise rights, stating his
belief in the principle
[t]hat every other obligation shall yield to that of the laws, as
to a superior moral force, is a tacit condition of membership in
every society . . . because no citizen can lawfully hold commu-
nion with those who have associated on any other terms, and
this ought, in all cases of collision, to be accounted a sufficient
dispensation to the conscience.127
Gibson’s positions became the best-known exposition of the
antiliberal position.  Although much of his reasoning comes in
dissent or in dicta, his writing had the intended effect.  It was
eventually adopted by the Pennsylvania courts.128  It was also
cited by other courts that embraced an antiexemptions interpre-
tation of free exercise.  In 1854, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine looked to Justice Gibson’s theories to articulate why a
public school should be permitted to expel a girl who refused to
take part in a school-sponsored Bible reading.129  Thereafter, in
1876 the Vermont courts directed readers to the section of the
Maine opinion that quoted Gibson when they refused to allow
students a right to leave school to attend religious services.130
125 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831).
126 Id.  at 417.
127 Id.
128 See  Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 322-23 (1848).
129 See  Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376, 411-12 (1854).
130 See  Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 470 (1876).
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Not citing Gibson, but very much in keeping with his reasoning, a
federal judge in Ohio instructed a jury not to accept a defen-
dant’s argument that he should be acquitted because the federal
law that he had broken violated his rights of conscience.131  Simi-
larly, in 1853 a federal judge in Pennsylvania gave a jury instruc-
tion that left no doubt that, to his mind, the Federal Free
Exercise Clause did not recognize a constitutional right to free
exercise exemptions.132
2. The Liberal Tradition in the State Courts
The antiliberal, categorically antiexemptions position that
some have attributed to the Founders is thus very much in evi-
dence in the nineteenth century.  It appears early, is noted by
commentators, and is continued in some jurisdictions right up to
1878.  However, in some of the earliest nineteenth-century cases,
judges allied themselves with a competing approach to interpret-
ing and applying free exercise clauses.  Judges who took a more
liberal view of exemptions outside the area of speech are very
much in evidence from the start of the nineteenth century.  As I
shall discuss in the next section, their position was approved by
some influential commentators, and some courts and congress-
men also appear to have embraced their position.
Judges who embraced the liberal interpretation of free exercise
clauses defined the scope of protected religious activity broadly.
They accepted as “religious” any sincerely held belief about God
and God’s command.  These judges were apparently willing to
contemplate the possibility that a religion would command peo-
ple to act in a way that a legislature had determined was danger-
ous to the health or peace of society.  More importantly, they
were skeptical that acts falling within the police powers of the
state and rendered illegal should always be considered
“nonpeaceable” or “harmful” for the purpose of free exercise
analysis.  Of course, the liberal approach is most obvious in cases
where judges actually granted free exercise exemptions.  How-
131 Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1045 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501).
132 The jury instruction stated, in part:
Some men of disordered understanding or perverted conscience may con-
ceive it a religious duty to break the law . . . . [I]f his opinions, ceasing to be
speculative, have ended in conduct, let no morbid sympathy—no false re-
spect for pretended “rights of conscience”—prevent either court or jury
from judging him justly . . . .
Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F. Cas. 1036, 1041 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 16,865).
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ever, the approach is implied in cases where judges stated that,
although they were denying exemptions in the case at bar, they
might be willing to grant exemptions under different
circumstances.
A New York court produced the most influential early case in
the liberal tradition—the 1813 case of People v. Philips .133  The
case arose out of an attempt to prosecute a Catholic for theft.
The prosecution subpoenaed a priest to reveal whether the de-
fendant had admitted the crime during the sacrament of confes-
sion.  The priest refused to obey the subpoena, and the New
York Court of General Sessions agreed that he had a constitu-
tional right to do so, holding, “It is essential to the free exercise
of a religion, that its ordinances should be administered—that its
ceremonies as well as its essentials should be protected.”134
Answering the priest’s claim, the prosecutor took precisely the
antiliberal position on exemptions that Hamburger, Bradley, and
Lash have imputed to the Founding generation.  First, the prose-
cutor argued that this was not an “exercise of religion” of the sort
that free exercise clauses sought to protect:  “[T]he constitution
has granted, religious ‘profession and worship ,’ to all denomina-
tions, . . . but it has not granted exemption from previous legal
duties.”135  Second, the prosecutor argued that, even if some be-
havior outside the area of ritual deserved protection, the New
York Constitution did not protect religious activity that was “in-
consistent with the peace or safety of this state.”136  And the
prosecutor argued, plausibly enough, that the priest’s refusal to
testify was inconsistent with society’s peace and safety:
To tolerate religious profession and worship is one thing; to
allow any person whatever, to conceal matters upon the
133 This case was decided by the Court of General Sessions, City of New York, on
June 14, 1813.  Although the case was not officially reported, the arguments and
opinion were printed in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA
9-114 (photo. reprint 1974) (1813), and they were widely distributed.  The case was
also the focus of Walter Walsh’s exhaustive article, The First Free Exercise Case . See
supra  note 44.  As Walsh has shown, the case was known and cited in many subse-
quent free exercise cases.  The court’s decision is also excerpted in Privileged Com-
munications to Clergymen , 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 199-209 (1955).
134 Privileged Communications to Clergymen , supra  note 133, at 207.
135 SAMPSON, supra  note 133, at 51.
136 See id.  at 44-45 (referring to the provision in the New York Constitution’s free
exercise clause, which provided that “the liberty of conscience hereby granted , shall
not be so construed to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices , inconsistent
with the peace or safety  of this state”).  For a longer analysis of the District Attor-
ney’s argument, see Walsh, supra  note 44, at 25-26.
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knowledge of which the public safety may depend, is another,
for said he, it is palpable that the pretention here set up, is
inconsistent with the safety, and he should say of course there-
fore, with the rights of society . . . .
. . . [A] tenet, which makes it a religious duty to conceal this
knowledge, thus necessary to the public safety, however it may
be seriously believed in, by its professors, comes within the
spirit of the constitutional proviso; which is in these words,
“Provided  that the liberty of conscience hereby granted , shall
not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or jus-
tify practices , inconsistent with the peace or safety  of this
state.”137
The court disagreed on all counts with this antiliberal interpre-
tation of free exercise guarantees.  It stressed that the Catholic
priest believed the act of confession, and of keeping the confi-
dence placed in him during confession, to be an essential part of
his obligation to obey God’s commands.138  This belief, the court
said, made it a “religious” obligation.  And “[i]t is essential to the
free exercise of a religion . . . that its ceremonies as well as its
essentials should be protected”139 and thus the religiously moti-
vated refusal to testify fell under the New York Constitution’s
protections for free exercise unless it was an act inconsistent with
the peace and safety of the state.140
The court then turned to the prosecution’s argument that the
act of keeping silent, even if religiously motivated, was inconsis-
tent with the “peace and safety” of the state.  It refused to accept
that the mere fact that an act was contrary to law made it pre-
sumptively too harmful to tolerate.  Admitting that the state
would clearly suffer harm, the court stressed that the harm would
be indirect, as the refusal to testify did not directly harm the state
but only facilitated antisocial activity.141  This was not enough.
Acts, even if they were illegal, should be considered peaceable
and eligible for exemptions unless they were “something actu-
ally, not negatively injurious . . . acts committed, not . . . acts
137 SAMPSON, supra  note 133, at 44-45 (summarizing argument of District Attor-
ney Gardinier).
138 Id.  at 102-03.  While this passage appears to preserve communal ritual, the
court also noted at several places that an individual had a right not to be pressed by
the state into an action that would cause him to fear for his or her soul. See, e.g. , id.
at 114 (“[Catholic priests] are protected by the laws and constitution of this country,
in the full and free exercise of their religion, and this court can never countenance or
authorize . . . torture to their consciences.”).
139 Id.  at 111.
140 Id.  at 111-12.
141 Id.  at 113.
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omitted—offences of a deep dye, and of an extensively injurious
nature . . . .”142  Any rule that defined peaceableness so narrowly
that the priest’s admittedly illegal activity could be considered
nonpeaceable and ineligible for exemptions was, the court said,
absurd, because it would render the constitution’s guarantee of
free exercise meaningless.  “It would be to destroy the enacting
clause of the proviso—and to render the exception broader than
the rule, to subvert all the principles of sound reasoning, and
overthrow all the convictions of common sense.”143
Four years later in 1817, the New York courts had the opportu-
nity to reconsider the holding in Philips .144  A trial court implic-
itly reaffirmed the principle announced in Philips , although it
found this principle did not apply to the case at bar.145
Some scholars have unconvincingly tried to argue that Philips
does not stand for the proposition that free exercise clauses grant
judges power to exempt citizens on grounds of conscience from
nondiscriminatory, generally applicable laws.146  More plausible,
142 Id.
143 Id.  at 113.  The court went on to state:
[U]ntil men under pretence of religion, act counter to the fundamental
principles of morality, and endanger the well being of the state, they are to
be protected in the free exercise of their religion.  If they are in error, or if
they are wicked, they are to answer [only] to the Supreme Being  . . . .
Id.  at 114.
Interestingly, the court explicitly suggested that the Federal Constitution’s Free
Exercise Clause provided this type of behavior with the same protection—albeit
from federal intrusion. Id.
144 See Privileged Communications to Clergymen , supra note 133, at 209 (discuss-
ing People v. Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (N.Y. 1817)).  In Smith , a
Protestant on trial for murder sought to bar from evidence the confession that he
had made to a Protestant clergyman. Id.  The clergyman, however, did not recog-
nize any religious bar to his testimony. Id.  at 211.  In permitting the minister to
testify, the court affirmed the reasoning of Philips , but argued that the priest-peni-
tent privilege protected an individual’s right to engage in a religious practice necessi-
tated by “the canons of the[ir] church.” Id.  Here, however, the court determined
that the confession had not been made to satisfy a religious obligation. Id.  Rather,
it was a confession made to a person, “in confidence, merely as friend or adviser.”
Id.  Shortly thereafter, the New York legislature enacted a statute barring anyone
from testifying about confessions made to him when he was acting in his professional
capacity as a priest or minister. See id.  at 213 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. 1828, pt. 3, c.
7, tit. 3, § 72).
This case is also discussed by McConnell, supra  note 8, at 1505-06 and Walsh,
supra note 44, at 40-41.
145 See Privileged Communications to Clergyman , supra  note 133, at 212.
146 Cf.  Bradley, supra note 9, at 290-93.  Bradley argues that Philips  is not prop-
erly considered a case supporting the grant of exemptions.  First, Bradley argues that
Philips  was not primarily a free exercise case because the court gives several possi-
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until recently, was the argument that Philips  was largely un-
known to contemporary courts and unrepresentative of contem-
porary opinions.147  Recently, however, Walter Walsh has shown
this proposition to be incorrect.  The opinion in Philips  was unof-
ficially reported and influential.  One of the counsel in the case
made sure that the report was widely distributed, and it became
far more influential than might normally be expected from an
opinion of a lower state court.148  Judges with a liberal bent on
the question of free exercise exemptions cited Philips  to support
their decisions granting exemptions.  Furthermore, as we have
seen, the opinion was raised by counsel in a Pennsylvania court,
where one antiliberal judge felt compelled to criticize it.149
Among courts that found the interpretation proposed in
Philips  persuasive were those of Virginia.  In the case of Com-
monwealth v. Cronin , a case uncovered by Walsh and not dis-
cussed in any of the originalist works on free exercise, a Virginia
court cited Philips  approvingly in holding that a priest was ex-
empted from answering questions about information learned in
confession.150
ble grounds for recognizing a priest-penitent privilege. Id.  at 290.  On this point, it
seems hard to agree.  As I read the opinion, the court based its holding primarily on
free exercise grounds, and the opinion has been cited by later courts as evidence for
the principle that courts should be prepared to grant exemptions.  Second, Bradley
argues that Philips  was not a conduct exemptions case because the subpoena re-
quirement was rooted in common law rather than statutory law. Id.  While one
might choose to narrow the opinion on these grounds, the court argued that the right
to an exemption is rooted in constitutional law, and there is nothing in the opinion
that suggests it felt the common law rule could be reinstated by statute.  Third, as
Bradley suggests, the court noted that the exemption was necessary to protect a
sacrament rather than “religiously motivated conduct” and thus its holding is argua-
bly narrower than Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  Bradley, supra note 9, at
290-91.  While this is true, the court does not suggest any bright line rule for deter-
mining what types of behavior are sufficiently central that they deserve protection.
While the principle announced in Philips  may not require the adoption of the princi-
ple later adopted in Sherbert , neither does it preclude it.  Finally, Bradley empha-
sizes that the court recognized that concerns about the public welfare could override
a person’s right to an exemption. Id.  at 291.  This is indisputably true.  Again, how-
ever, courts did not create an objective test for balancing individual rights against
the general welfare.
147 See, e.g. , Bradley, supra  note 9, at 290; Lash, supra  note 9, at 1124 n.77; Mark
Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse , 1993 BYU L. REV. 117, 125.  For a
useful summary and critique of these authors, see Walsh, supra  note 44, at 64-70.
148 For a short biography of William Sampson, counsel to Philips, see Walsh, supra
note 44, at 12-15.  For information on publication of the case, see id.  at 40.
149 Simon’s Ex’rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 417 (Pa. 1831).
150 See Walsh, supra note 44, at 40 (discussing Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q. L.J.
128 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855)).
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Courts in South Carolina also embraced the liberal free exer-
cise principles announced in Philips .  As noted previously, the
high court of South Carolina initially embraced an antiliberal ap-
plication of the exemptions principle.151  Only four years later,
however, the courts of South Carolina reversed course.  After a
restructuring of the South Carolina court system, the new high
court in 1827 revisited the question of exemptions and opted to
follow New York’s example.  In a pair of opinions recently un-
covered by Walsh, a trial court cited Philips as support for its
decision to grant an exemption, and the new high court of South
Carolina, the Court of Appeals, unanimously affirmed.152
Thus, long before Justice Gibson articulated his influential
antiexemptions interpretation of free exercise guarantees, a New
York court had articulated an influential, pro-exemptions inter-
pretation.  According to this theory, the mere fact that an act was
illegal did not render it nonpeaceable and thus, ineligible for ex-
emptions.  This position was adopted by other courts in the mid-
dle years of the nineteenth century, and as we shall see shortly, a
similar position seems implicitly to have been embraced by some
commentators.
C. Nineteenth-Century Commentaries Discussing Free Exercise
Exemptions Outside the Area of Speech
When considering the evolution of nineteenth-century think-
ing on the question of free exercise, a source of information that
deserves more study is the body of academic commentary that
described or commented upon evolving notions of free exercise.
In the forty years before George Reynolds sought a free exercise
exemption from federal antipolygamy laws, a number of treatises
discussed evolving doctrines of free exercise in the United States.
Some specifically addressed the question of what types of relig-
ious practice, if any, could be exempted.  This is a body of litera-
ture that has remained largely unexplored.  However, the texts
151 See  discussion supra  Part III.B.1 (discussing State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 Mc-
Cord) 393 (S.C. 1823)).
152 See  Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 CAROLINA L.J. 202, 213 (Union Dist. S.C.
1827).  Walsh points out the intriguing fact that the affirming panel contained two
judges from the panel in Willson , 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) at 393, discussed supra  Part
III.B.1.  That panel had earlier rejected the very idea that one could have a genu-
inely “religious” objection to a law.  Walsh suggests that the decision, decided in the
wake of Philips , represents an implicit overruling of the earlier antiliberal case. See
Walsh, supra note 44, at 42.
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strongly suggest that both the liberal and antiliberal interpreta-
tions of free exercise clauses had academic champions.
The earliest treatises on American law do not provide much
insight into the American view of free exercise exemptions for
actions other than speech.  As discussed above, their discussions
of blasphemy implicate the question of exemptions but do not
develop a larger exemptions principle, nor do they focus on the
question of how to handle exemptions for nonspeech activities.153
Tucker’s early edition of William Blackstone’s Commentaries
does not contain any meaningful discussion of American consti-
tutional guarantees of religious free exercise rights outside the
area of speech,154 nor does James Kent’s Commentaries on Amer-
ican Law .155  Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States  discusses the adoption of constitutional clauses
protecting freedom of religion and discusses the principles ani-
mating the adoption of the establishment clause, but it does not
provide much insight into the manner in which the clauses were
interpreted or the way Story thought they should be applied to
cases involving exemptions outside the area of speech.156
As free exercise jurisprudence gradually coalesced in the nine-
teenth century, however, some commentators began to note that
free exercise guarantees protected the right of people to engage
in nonmalicious religious speech and implied that these guaran-
153 See  discussion supra  Part III.A.
154 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES:  WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
155 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th
ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873).
156 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).  Story discusses the First Amendment,
but the focus is almost entirely on the Establishment Clause. Id.  at 722-31 (the
discussion of free exercise comes on page 731).  A prohibition against establishment
of a national church
would have been an imperfect security, if it had not been followed up by a
declaration of the right of the free exercise of religion, and a prohibition
(as we have seen) of all religious tests.  Thus, the whole power over the
subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted
upon according to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions;
and the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the Arminian, the
Jew and the Infidel may sit down at the common table of the national coun-
cils, without any inquisition into their faith, or mode of worship.
Id.  at 731.  This seems to not answer the question of whether the right to be free of
“inquiry into their mode of worship” would give people a right to be exempted from
laws prohibiting acts that a believer thinks constitutes “worship.”
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tees protected the right of people to engage in other religious
actions, so long as the actions were peaceable and did not tend to
cause unacceptable harm to society.  Like judges, commentators
were unclear about how to distinguish protected “religious” be-
havior from nonreligious behavior, nor were they clear about
how to determine whether religious behavior was nonpeaceable
and inherently threatening.
Some early commentators who focused specifically on the
question of exemptions took what I have characterized as a lib-
eral position.  They suggested that religious convictions may
compel people to behave in a manner that the legislature has
seen fit to prohibit.  Since the whole point of free exercise clauses
is constitutionally to prevent political majorities from imposing
on the right to act in accordance with one’s conscience, these
commentators felt that the right to free exercise implied that
judges must have the ability to grant judicial exemptions under at
least some circumstances.  Thus, for example, Edward Mans-
field’s 1845 treatise on women contained a vague but implicitly
liberal section on individual rights:
Another absolute right of individuals in the United States, is
the right to conscience and its enjoyment, in religious faith,
profession and worship .  This is guarded, so far as the legisla-
tion of Congress goes, by the 1st Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, which provides that Congress can
make “no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”  By
the Constitution of Ohio, and by the Constitutions of nearly
all the States of the Union, the utmost freedom and latitude is
allowed to every form of religious creed or worship, and even
to those who have no belief. . . .
What is called the rights of conscience would be very diffi-
cult of definition in words, but the practice in the United
States has given it a very clear exposition.  It is the right to
believe, to utter what is believed, and to worship according to
that belief.  It is regarded here as the most sacred of all
rights.157
Obviously, this passage begs the question of what the term
“worship” means.  As we shall see shortly, however, some com-
mentators accepted that “worship” included all acts that a relig-
ious community, or perhaps a single person, believed must be
done to carry out one’s obligation to “honor” God.158  And a
157 MANSFIELD, supra note 91, at 146-47.
158 See  discussion infra  in this Part III.C.  For example, it is implicit in John
O’Brien’s discussion of what types of “religious” behavior are protected by the First
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citizen’s right to carry out such an act on grounds of conscience
was protected until the act turned out to be nonpeaceable or
harmful to important social interests.159  But for reasons that we
have already described, acceptance of this principle did not nec-
essarily imply acceptance of a liberal perspective on the question
of free exercise exemptions.  The distinction between liberal and
antiliberal positions often depended on whether disobedience to
the state was automatically presumed to constitute nonpeaceable
behavior and thus be harmful.
Mansfield was not clear about his feelings on such crucial is-
sues.  However, another treatise written at almost the same time
seems cautiously to have proposed that free exercise guarantees
give citizens a right to free exercise exemptions.  John O’Brien’s
1846 A Treatise on American Military Laws  contains a lengthy
discussion on the subject of the military’s power to compel
soldiers to act in a way that is inconsistent with the soldiers’ relig-
ious conscience.160  O’Brien concluded that the First Amend-
ment’s guarantee of free exercise gives soldiers a right to be
exempted from laws unless exempting them would threaten the
ability of the army to fight.161  Considering the issue of soldiers
who wish to abstain from military-sponsored church services,
O’Brien argued that such soldiers are protected by the First
Amendment:
The amendment we are considering, also forbids Congress to
pass any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. . . .
. . . [I]t is a matter of religious duty with members of some
creeds, to abstain from attendance at the divine service of any
other than their own church.  This abstinence is for them, as
much an exercise of religion as any positive act.  They are ex-
ercising their religion by this, as much as a Jew is doing so,
when he abstains from the flesh of unclean animals.
. . . .
. . . The general principle is fully admitted, that any con-
struction of one part of the constitution which renders another
portion of the same instrument a mere nullity, must necessa-
Amendment. JOHN O’BRIEN, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN MILITARY LAWS, AND
THE PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL (Phila., Lea & Blanchard 1846).  It is explicit in
other works, such as Lieber’s On Civil Liberty:  “[M]an has a right, not necessarily a
moral right, nor a right in point of judgment, but a civil right, to worship God ac-
cording to his own conscience, without suffering any hardships at the hands of his
neighbors for so doing.” LIEBER, supra  note 66, at 100 n.1.
159 See  discussion infra  in this Part III.C.
160 O’BRIEN, supra note 158.
161 Id.  at 59-61.
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rily be erroneous.  One clause may limit or modify the effect
of another, but it can never destroy it. . . . If it can be shown,
that this prohibition [on laws forcing people to violate their
conscience] necessarily  interferes with any power necessary
for Congress to exercise the prerogative of raising or organiz-
ing an army, we will readily admit, that so far as it does so
conflict, and so far as relates to the public force , it is
ineffective.162
In short, people have a right to exemptions from legislation
unless their disobedience makes it absolutely impossible for the
legislature to carry out one of its essential, enumerated responsi-
bilities.  Implicitly admitting that some Americans took a less lib-
eral view of free exercise exemptions, the treatise made an
impassioned demand that the public recognize at least some right
to exemptions.  Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility that
there were cases where permitting an exemption would interfere
with an essential government function such as raising an army,
O’Brien insisted that it was generally wrong to interfere with
people’s attempts to honor and obey God as they understand
they are supposed to do:
It seems scarcely credible, that in this nineteenth century, so
vaunted for its enlightenment, individuals can be found so
warped by prejudice, as to desire to interfere forcibly with
man’s relations to his God. . . . No matter how they may dis-
guise themselves under the plausible mask of benevolently ad-
vancing the best interests of man, they should be indignantly
spurned by every true Christian, by every free American.163
One might be tempted to discount Mansfield’s and O’Brien’s
treatises on the grounds that they were not written by experts on
constitutional law or that their discussions of religious freedom
occur in the context of a larger discussion about an area of law
separate from that of constitutional law.  In both tone and argu-
ment, however, their discussions of free exercise anticipated ones
found in some later, highly influential works on constitutional
rights.  These later works also suggest that religious liberty in-
cludes some privilege to fulfill one’s perceived religious obliga-
tions.  While admitting that people cannot be permitted to
disobey essential social regulations, these works suggest that not
all regulations can be considered essential.  Frustratingly, these
works never articulate a clear principle that would allow people
to distinguish between (i) regulations that ban peaceable behav-
162 Id.  at 60-61 (emphasis added).
163 Id.  at 65-66.
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ior and can lawfully be disobeyed on grounds of conscience and
(ii) regulations that play such an important role in maintaining
the public peace that they cannot be subject to religious exemp-
tions.  Nevertheless, they give examples of the types of action
that fit into the two different categories.164  (For the purpose of
understanding Reynolds v. United States, it is important to note
that one regularly finds among the regulations that are described
as crucial to public order and thus not subject to exemption, the
regulations of marriage and, particularly, the laws banning
polygamy.)165
One influential work that seems to favor at least the qualified
grant of exemptions came from the pen of Francis Lieber.166  As
already noted above, Lieber had argued in his work, Manual of
Political Ethics , that governments were not capable of policing
belief.167  Thus, belief did not need constitutional protection, and
the constitutional guarantees of free exercise therefore must pro-
tect, to some degree, the right to act on one’s beliefs.168  Ex-
panding on that point in the 1859 edition of his influential work
On Civil Liberty and Self-Government , Lieber asserted that “lib-
erty of conscience” is a misnomer and that the debate should be
about “liberty of worship.”169  He then discussed the types of be-
havior liberty of worship must protect.  Among the protected
acts was the act of reading a religious text that the legislature has
forbidden.170
At the time that Lieber wrote, the question of whether people
could publicly read disfavored religious texts was nearly as
fraught with controversy as the question of blasphemy.  The deci-
sion to read a particular religious text clearly constituted an exer-
cise of “religion.”  Antiliberal courts, however, could argue that
where an act had been prohibited by a legislature (not because it
was  an act of worship, but because the legislature deemed it
harmful), courts were obliged to consider the act disorderly or
harmful, and thus deny requests for a free exercise exemption
164 See  discussion of Lieber, Thompson, Sedgwick, and Cooley infra  in this Part
III.C.
165 See  discussion infra  Parts III.C and V.
166 For Lieber’s background and influence, see text accompanying supra notes 62-
70.
167 LIEBER, supra  note 64, at 189-90.
168 See  text accompanying supra notes 67-70.
169 LIEBER, supra note 66, at 99.
170 Id.  at 100 n.1.
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from the law.  Thus, as we have already seen, one court in Maine
allowed a student to be expelled from school simply because she
wished to be exempted from the obligation to read one transla-
tion of the Bible and instead to be permitted to read from a dif-
ferent translation.171
In a telling footnote, Lieber quoted and praised a speech given
to a “Society for Protecting the Rights of Conscience.”172  This
society agitated for the rights of people in Catholic countries who
had been imprisoned for violating generally applicable, nondis-
criminatory state laws prohibiting reading the Bible in the ver-
nacular.173  In a passage that Lieber cited with approval, the
speaker seemed to disapprove of antiliberal positions that would
permit such a result:
[W]e understand not necessarily that every one is right in the
religion that he adopts, but that his neighbors have no right to
interfere with him. . . . [M]an has a right, not necessarily a
moral right, nor a right in point of judgment, but a civil right,
to worship God according to his own conscience, without suf-
fering any hardships at the hands of his neighbors for so do-
ing. . . . [W]hen attempts are made to compel men to conform
to what they do not conscientiously believe . . . a society like
this ought to come forward . . . .174
Lieber was not an absolutist.  He accepted that religious com-
munities might require their adherents to engage in behavior that
was so obviously harmful that it should be considered axiomati-
cally nonpeaceable and ineligible for exemptions.  Sadly, Lieber
did not provide a principle for distinguishing between acts that
were so harmful as to preclude them from exemptions and acts
that were harmless enough to deserve exemptions.  He simply
offered the Mormon practice of polygamy as an example of such
harmful behavior.  He explained at length why the practice was
so intrinsically and inevitably harmful that it could not be permit-
ted.175  It was up to the reader to try and infer a principle that
would apply to future cases.
Clearly, Lieber thought majoritarian legislatures could and
sometimes were likely to prohibit behavior that fell clearly in the
category of peaceable, though illegal, activity that constitution-
171 See  Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 379-96 (1854).
172 LIEBER, supra  note 66, at 100 n.1.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.  at 101-02.  For further analysis of Lieber’s treatment of polygamy, see text
accompanying infra notes 238-44.
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ally could not be prohibited.  In an impassioned conclusion, he
reminded his readers that, in numerous sects of Christianity in
nineteenth-century America, one found new zeal among believ-
ers to conform to religious laws that the majority may find repug-
nant.  Society must  respect the rights of those believers, and
dreadful consequences would befall any society that did not re-
spect rights of people within the minority to conform their be-
havior to their understanding of religion.176
Theodore Sedgwick’s 1857 treatise on statutory and constitu-
tional law is extraordinary insofar as it implies that protections of
religious exercise provided a very broad right to exemptions.177
Sedgwick suggested that this right might not  permit the federal
government to ban even so harmful an activity as polygamy in
the territories:
The Constitution contains no more important clause than that
prohibiting all laws prescribing religious tests, establishing re-
ligion, or interfering with its free exercise; and fortunately,
thus far, the wise spirit of our people has come up to the sa-
gacity and foresight of our ancestors. . . . It may be remarked,
however, that the recent organization of a distinct territorial
government about to claim admission as a State, exclusively
occupied by settlers who declare polygamy to be one of their
fundamental institutions, presents the problems connected
with this matter in a new aspect, and will undoubtedly put our
principle of absolute toleration to a very severe test.178
While Sedgwick did not explicitly state that Mormons could get
an exemption from laws banning polygamy, he nevertheless ap-
peared to believe that the Constitution could plausibly be inter-
preted to require them—a result that he considered troubling.
While these commentators all seem to tend in a liberal direc-
tion, the antiliberal position also had academic champions among
nineteenth-century commentators.  In the years prior to Reyn-
olds , Thomas Cooley’s A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations
came to stand alongside Lieber’s as a leading authority on consti-
tutional law.179  In descriptive terms, Cooley is ambiguous about
the extent to which courts felt compelled to grant exemptions.
176 LIEBER, supra  note 66, at 101.
177 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE IN-
TERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(N.Y., John S. Voorhies 1857).
178 Id.  at 607-08.
179 COOLEY, supra  note 59. See  discussion of Cooley’s influence supra  Part III.C
and text accompanying notes 62-66.
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However, in normative terms, Cooley stands as a counterweight
to the generally liberal bent of mid-nineteenth-century treatises.
Cooley stressed that he did not put much stock in the proposi-
tion that there was a natural right to freedom of religion.  In his
view, religious rights consisted only of the rights granted by legal
documents, including constitutions.180  Governments must be re-
strained from acting arbitrarily.181  Nevertheless, if the masses
felt strongly that all religious disputation should be banned, then
Cooley presumably would have accepted that they could enact a
constitution with such a ban.  The question for Cooley, then, was
whether the American people had done such a thing.
As Cooley saw it, American constitutions may have imposed
on a government’s ability to restrain a person’s worship, but they
did not limit it absolutely.182  He confirmed that there was con-
sensus in state courts that free exercise clauses did not merely
protect belief but also protected some types of action, including
speech and the ill-defined category of acts that constitute wor-
ship.  Cooley took a liberal view of “worship,” which included all
acts that a person believes are necessary if God is to be properly
honored.  According to Cooley, the rights of free exercise estab-
lish a principle that “[n]o external authority is to place itself be-
tween the finite being and the Infinite, when the former is
seeking to render that homage which is due, and in a mode which
commends itself to his belief as suitable for him to render and
acceptable to its object.”183
At the same time, however, Cooley made clear that the right
to engage in such behavior has always been limited by the re-
quirement that the act in question not be of a type that is injuri-
ous to the public welfare or imposes on the rights of others.
Perceptively, he noted that social understandings of welfare or of
180 To understand Cooley’s thinking, it helps to read his later treatise on torts, in
which he explained that he liked to conceptualize “civil liberties” in a way that com-
promised between a positivist definition of “civil liberty” as the rights granted by the
sovereign with a liberal one that saw rights as liberties owned by each human as a
privilege of belonging to civilized society—a position he explicitly associated with
Lieber. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 9-10 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1880).
Cooley thus suggested that “civil liberty” should be defined as the liberties that exist
after the state placed “limitations and restraints upon the action of individual mem-
bers of the political society as are needed to prevent what would be injurious to
other individuals or prejudicial to the general welfare.” Id.  at 9.
181 Id.
182 Id.  at 33-35.
183 COOLEY, supra  note 59, at 469-70.
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countervailing rights are socially constructed, and he explored
the types of worship that have been seen as sufficiently injurious
so that constitutions permit them to be banned.184
Cooley noted the disagreement about when, if ever, free exer-
cise guarantees should be understood to require judges to grant
free exercise exemptions.185  According to Cooley, constitutional
limitations embodied in free exercise clauses had been construed
to require free exercise exemptions from laws that would prevent
learned people from disputing questions of religion.  They had
not been construed to require exemptions for behavior that the
public viewed as outrages upon basic moral norms (such as
human sacrifices or polygamy) or views as violations of society’s
ability to worship as they please (including, apparently, the en-
forcement of a day of rest on Sundays).186
In A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations , Cooley did not
propose a clear principle that would explain the distinction be-
tween acts that had received exemptions and acts that had not.
He noted simply that the constitution in some cases required mi-
184 Id.  at 471-72; cf. COOLEY, supra  note 180, at 34.  In his treatise on tort law,
Cooley stated:
Religious liberty in any country cannot embrace those things which the
moral sense or sense of decency of the general public condemns, and which
consequently cannot be allowed without injury to the public morals.
. . . [T]he standard of immorality and crime must be the general sense of
the people embodied in the law.
Cooley , supra note 180, at 34.
185 COOLEY, supra  note 59, at 477-78.  In an intriguing passage, Cooley suggested
that the issue may have failed to reach consensus because it often did not arise, as
American lawmakers generally felt an obligation to consider the religious sensibili-
ties of people who might be affected by the law:
Whatever deference the Constitution or the laws may require to be paid in
some cases to the conscientious scruples or religious convictions of the ma-
jority, the general policy always is to carefully avoid any compulsion which
infringes on the religious scruples of any, however little reason may seem
to other persons to underlie them.  Even in the important matter of bearing
arms for the public defence, those who cannot in conscience do so are ex-
cused, and their proportion of this great and sometimes necessary burden is
borne by the rest of the community.
Id.
186 Id.  at 469-77.  Focusing on the example of Sunday closing laws, Cooley noted
that they were upheld and that judges were not always clear about why they upheld
them.  The first possible reason was that Sunday closing is “an enforced deference
[to] which one differing from the common belief pays to the public conscience.” Id.
at 477.  The second reason was that it was necessary to preserve public health. Id.  at
475-77.  Although he found that some courts felt constrained to argue the latter, he
noted that authority exists for the former as well. Id.
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norities to defer to the religious convictions of the majority.187
He appeared to be comfortable with this.
Joseph Thompson’s Church and State in the United States with
an Appendix on the German Population  is intriguingly ambiva-
lent on the question of exemptions.188  Its author seemed to be
caught between, on the one hand, a desire to advocate a liberal
approach in the vein of Lieber, and on the other hand, a fear of
Catholicism and Mormonism that drove him in the direction of
Cooley’s nonjudgmental acceptance of the antiliberal position on
the question of exemptions.
Thompson began with a strong statement that constitutional
language protecting rights of “religion” or “free exercise” pro-
tects not only the right to believe what one chooses about the
divine, but also one’s right to act in accordance with one’s beliefs:
Liberty of opinion, liberty of worship, liberty in all matters
pertaining to religion, is not a privilege created or conceded by
the State, but is a right inherent in the personality of the indi-
vidual conscience; and the State is pledged not to interfere
with that right.  Such is the theory of the National
Constitution.189
Thompson quickly made clear, however, that this language had
to be read against the backdrop of a separationist philosophy.
Thompson argued that boundaries existed between the jurisdic-
tion of religion and of the state.  Although he was not clear
where exactly the boundaries laid, he appeared to be concerned
about the growth of religions like Mormonism and Catholicism—
each of which claimed a right to regulate action that Thompson
felt was properly within the jurisdiction of civil authority.190  He
thus stressed that his support for absolute rights to engage in re-
ligious acts was not an absolute right to engage in any  activity
187 Id.  In normative terms, however, Cooley, unlike Lieber or other liberal com-
mentators on free exercise, seemed to favor an antiliberal position.  As he made
clear in his later treatise on torts, he thought the legislatures of a democracy should
be trusted to define, at its discretion, what type of religious worship was “disorderly”
and subject to prohibition, notwithstanding free exercise guarantees. See, e.g. , COO-
LEY, supra note 180, at 34-35.  Note that, in contrast to other parts of the treatise,
such as the chapter on family rights, Cooley does not cite case law that would serve
to indicate that his view was more widely accepted than the contrary view.  Indeed,
he only cites his own treatise, Constitutional Limitations , and a work of political
science.
188 THOMPSON, supra note 91.
189 Id.  at 13-14.
190 See id.  at 23-28 (discussing “Mormons, Chinese, and Jesuits”); id.  at 140-41
(giving a diatribe against the Mormons).
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that one felt was mandated by God.191
Thompson struggled to draw the distinction between (i) mat-
ters of “worship,” which were peaceable and could not constitu-
tionally be interfered with and (ii) essential matters of civil
administration, which were always subject to governmental regu-
lation.192  Apparently, the distinction depended, in some ill-de-
fined way, upon the degree to which society’s interests were
involved.  Religious belief could excuse some acts of disobedi-
ence to law, but not all and certainly not acts that would inevita-
bly lead to the destruction of society:
The American people honor the sentiment of Peter, that “it is
right to obey God rather than man;” and they applaud the he-
roic protest of Luther at Worms, “Hier stehe ich: ich kann nicht
anders; Gott helfe mir .”  But when the god set higher than
man is a foreign potentate, who asserts his supremacy over the
State; when the conscience that claims to be inviolate is a
church embodied as a political infallibility, and enthroned
above all civil laws and institutions,—then the people say, “So-
ciety has rights as sacred as the rights of conscience.  Govern-
ment, no less than religion, is from God.  Conscience shall not
harbor conspiracy; religion shall not foster revolution; your pi-
ous devotion shall not plot our destruction.”193
In short, Thompson believed that some religions, particularly
Mormonism and Catholicism, failed to recognize the proper
boundary between the religious leader who issued rules in the
religious sphere and the “potentate” who issued essential regula-
tions in the civil sphere.194  He was not clear about how to define
the acts that fall within the sphere of religion (the sphere where a
Lutheran must be permitted to follow Luther in saying “Hier
stehe ich . . .”), but the examples that he offered consisted of
activities that nineteenth-century Americans almost universally
considered directly and catastrophically harmful (and, interest-
191 See id.  at 139-40.  In particular, Thompson stated:
The State concedes to every citizen the right to carry his religious notions
to the extreme of folly, his religious practice to the extravagance of enthusi-
asm.  So long as his actions are harmless, his vagaries are left to the correc-
tive of public discussion. . . . [B]ut if he should fire the library, the treasury,
the capitol, he would find that liberty itself has an asylum for the madman,
a prison for the incendiary, a gallows for the traitor.
Id.
192 Id.  at 29-31.
193 Id.  at 138-39.
194 Id.  In other sections, he seems, implicitly, to indicate more deference to activi-
ties commanded by religions other than Mormonism. Id.  at 29-31.
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ingly enough, ones that were for the most part associated either
with foreign cultures or with Mormonism):
Though no form of religious belief or worship, simply as such ,
can justly be proscribed in a free state, yet for reasons of pub-
lic morality, or for the safety and order of the Commonwealth,
the State may forbid and punish acts done in the name of re-
ligion; as, for instance, polygamy as practised by the Mormons,
the infanticide of the Chinese, or the self-immolation of Hin-
doo devotees.195
Apparently, then, according to Thompson, whether an act
counts as religious or peaceable (and thus the exemptability of
that act) depends on the degree that it tends to harm the welfare
of others.  This is further implied in a later section where Thomp-
son takes great pains to explain why the Mormon practice of po-
lygamy, which might plausibly seem to be private, actually has
serious effects on society and why, therefore, polygamy is an ac-
tivity that can be banned by the state.196
In summary, although nineteenth-century case law has been
exhaustively scrutinized, treatises seem to be a largely untapped
source of research about nineteenth-century views on free exer-
cise.  From my review of treatises directly discussing the specific
question of exemptions outside the area of speech, it seems that
the treatises struggle with the question.  They fail to come up
with a clear principle distinguishing between “worship” and “civil
responsibility,” or between nonpeaceable and peaceable acts of
worship.  That said, they seem often, though not always, to take
the “liberal” position that constitutional guarantees of free exer-
cise limit the government’s ability to interfere with religious prac-
tices outside the area of speech.  Under some circumstances,
religious believers engaging in activities they believed to be com-
manded by God must be given an exemption from generally ap-
plicable, duly enacted law.  Instead of giving clear guidance on
the circumstances under which exemptions are appropriate, lib-
eral treatises give examples both of regulations that the author
believes citizens have a right to violate on grounds of conscience
and of regulations that they do not.
Intriguingly, if there is a trend in the evolution of nineteenth-
century treatises on the topic of free exercise, it seems to be away
from a liberal position and toward an antiliberal position.  Kurt
195 Id.  at 18-19.
196 Id.  at 18-21. See  text accompanying infra  notes 260-63.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 53  9-MAR-07 8:56
2006] Free Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of Polygamy 421
Lash has hypothesized that with the rise of abolitionism, Ameri-
can free exercise thinking became increasingly liberal on the
question of exemptions.197  At least among academic commenta-
tors, the opposite seems to have occurred.  The rise of Catholic
immigration and Mormon power in the West seems to have
driven some commentators toward an antiliberal, or at least a
more explicitly antiliberal, position.198
In any case, an analysis of nineteenth-century treatises seem to
confirm the conclusions we drew from the case law.  The liberal
and antiliberal positions each had early champions and continued
to have champions among commentators and judges well into the
Reconstruction era, when the Supreme Court would hear and for
the first time decide the merits of a claim for a free exercise ex-
emption under the Federal Constitution.
D. Congressional Debates About the Meaning of Free Exercise
In addition to nineteenth-century cases and treatises, other
materials may provide further support for the idea that the lib-
eral position in the debates about exemptions remained strong as
the nineteenth century progressed.  As Kurt Lash has pointed
197 Kurt Lash, who believes that the Founders did not recognize the rights of free
exercise as implying a right to free exercise exemptions, has argued that in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, the Second Great Awakening, the rise of religiously
inspired abolitionism, and the ordeal of the Civil War all combined to force a sea
change in American feelings about free exercise. See generally  Lash, supra  note 9,
at 1111-30, 1147. In his view, Americans in the postwar period came to reject the
original antiexemptions position, instead believing that the Fourteenth Amendment
gave citizens a right to free exercise exemptions from state laws.  It is possible that
the Second Great Awakening and the rise of evangelical political agitation on ques-
tions such as slavery were events that caused Americans to reflect more deeply upon
the exemptions debate and inspired liberal commentators to write in favor of a posi-
tion that had primarily affected marginal groups such as blasphemers, Jews, and
Catholics.  It is further possible that as the nineteenth century progressed, the type
of authors who felt compelled to discuss religion in unlikely places or to write whole
treatises on the subject of rights were drawn more heavily from the evangelical activ-
ists favorably inclined to claims of individual liberty in the area of religion.
198 Earlier treatises, including Lieber’s, appear to favor an ambiguously liberal
view on the question of exemptions.  They contemplated that exemptions should be
granted without explicitly providing a definition of the types of activity that can and
cannot be exempted.  Later treatises appeared after the Mormon controversy had
fanned fears about the potential social effects of religiously motivated practices, par-
ticularly the Mormon practice of polygamy and the Catholic recognition of papal
authority.  During the period, some treatises seemed to take a more restrictive lib-
eral position, explaining why the right to exemptions could exist without extending
the right to Mormon polygamists.  Others, such as Cooley, championed the anti-
liberal position that judges should defer to majoritian conclusions that an act is too
morally outrageous or socially harmful to be exempt based on religious grounds.
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out, after the Civil War Congress took a serious interest in the
question of religious freedom.199  Relying heavily on congres-
sional debates, Lash argued that many Americans after the Civil
War embraced a liberal and pro-exemptions interpretation of
“free exercise.”200  Whether or not the majority took this view,
some congressmen seemed to do so.
As shown by the debates analyzed by Lash, the states’ repre-
sentatives in Congress disagreed about which types of “religion”
were protected and about how harmful a religiously motivated
act had to be before Congress could ban it.  Some congressmen
took an antiliberal position that they had discretion to regulate a
broad range of actions inspired by nontraditional religious be-
liefs.201  In contrast, however, many senators argued for a liberal
interpretation and application of free exercise principles, arguing
that the Free Exercise Clause limited Congress and the states’
power to prevent citizens from carrying out their perceived relig-
ious obligations.  To their mind, although legislatures could ban
nonpeaceable or socially harmful religious behavior, courts did
not have to defer to the legislative conclusion that an activity
should be considered nonpeaceable or unacceptably harmful.202
199 Lash, supra  note 9, at 1146-56.
200 Id.
201 Thus, in line with the less liberal courts, some congressmen tried to argue that
the First Amendment protected, at most, a narrow range of Christian ritual actions.
Some even took the extreme position that no true religion would condone illegal
activity and thus, tautologically, no illegal action could conceivably be motivated by
“religious” conviction. See, e.g. , CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872)
(“The words of the constitutional amendment do not mean that Congress shall pass
no law regulating man’s external conduct, for that is morality.  The ‘exercise of relig-
ion’ means worship.  It can mean nothing else.”) (statement of Frederick Frelinghuy-
sen).  Others suggested that the rights of religious free exercise did apply to
Christian beliefs.  “Surely,” said Congressman Thomas Nelson of Tennessee, “[the
Founding fathers] never intended that the wild vagaries of the Hindoo or the ridicu-
lous mummeries of the Hottentot should be ennobled by [the] honored and sacred
name [of religion].” GORDON, supra  note 63, at 81 & n.53 (quoting Congressman
Thomas A.R. Nelson’s speech Polygamy in the Territories of the United States  from
1860).
202 According to Lash, Senator Henry Wilson had embraced the mainstream posi-
tion described in the treatises analyzed above when he stated, “Religion, ‘consisting
in the performance of all known duties to God and our fellow men[.]’”  Lash, supra
note 9, at 1146 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864)).  In the
postwar Congress, many senators agreed with that assessment and argued that Con-
gress was thus without power to impose laws that restricted people’s ability to per-
form activities that violated their perceived religious duties.  This was true even
when it came to laws that would hasten the reconstruction of the South.  For in-
stance, Senator Henry Anthony argued that Congress could not pass laws that pro-
hibited segregated churches. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 821 (1872) (“If
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In short, then, congressmen, like judges and commentators,
seemed deeply divided over the question of free exercise
exemptions.
IV
NINETEENTH-CENTURY DISCUSSIONS OF FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSES:  IMPLICATIONS FOR DEBATES ABOUT ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
If we focus on legal texts that deal with the precise issue of free
exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws that directly
prohibit a person from carrying out a religious obligation, then
nineteenth-century case law and commentaries do not support
either of the leading originalist claims about the Founders’ un-
derstanding of the Free Exercise Clause.  The ongoing disagree-
ment revealed in both case law and commentary does not
support the idea that there was a single consensus view at the
time of the Founding about whether free exercise guarantees im-
plied a right to exemptions.  If anything, it suggests (though it
does not prove) that there was no common “original understand-
ing” of the Clause.
As I have explained above, the earliest free exercise cases, in-
cluding those on blasphemy, seem to suggest a “liberal” position
consistent with the idea that judges could grant exemptions.203
But in those opinions, judges clearly felt compelled to respond to
people who took antiliberal positions of the sort that Hamburger,
there are white men so foolish as to believe that it is not right for negroes to worship
with them, I pity them, but I shall not vote to deprive them of their undoubted right
to worship so.”).  Senator John Bingham argued eloquently that the Fourteenth
Amendment invalidated all laws which prevented people from fulfilling what they
perceived to be their sacred obligations:
Before [the Fourteenth Amendment,] a State, as in the case of the State of
Illinois, could make it a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment for any
citizen within her limits, in obedience to the injunction of our divine
Master, to help a slave who was ready to perish; to give him shelter, or
break with him his crust of bread.  The validity of that State restriction
upon the rights of conscience and the duty of life was affirmed, to the
shame and disgrace of America, in the Supreme Court of the United
States; but nevertheless affirmed in obedience to the requirements of the
Constitution.
APP. TO THE CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1871).  At the same session, he
also said:  “Under the Constitution as it is, not as it was, and by force of the four-
teenth amendment, no State hereafter can . . . ever repeat the example of Georgia
and send men to the penitentiary, as did that State, for teaching the Indian to read
the lessons of the New Testament . . . .” Id.
203 See  discussion supra  Parts III.A–B.
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Bradley, and Lash associate with the Founders.  This suggests
that such antiliberal positions were widely held.  From the 1830s
through Reconstruction, antiliberal and liberal judicial opinions
are both evident.  Commentaries also consistently reflected disa-
greement and sometimes profound ambivalence about the issue.
One cannot rule out the possibility that there was  a consensus
at the time of the Founding that broke down early in the nine-
teenth century.  Kurt Lash suggests that just such a shift occurred
later in the century.204  However, it appears to me that from a
very early period, when Americans were actually faced with con-
crete cases where people asked for exemptions, they understood
that there were two plausible readings of constitutional free exer-
cise clauses—one that automatically precluded judges from ever
granting exemptions, and another that left open the possibility of
exemptions in cases of legislative or executive overreach.  It
seems unlikely that people would have split so sharply and so
early if they had come of age, or had been taught by people who
came of age, at a time of consensus about the meaning of “free
exercise.”
Michael McConnell, Gerald Bradley, and, to a lesser extent,
Kurt Lash agree that nineteenth-century consensus about free
exercise, if it existed, would suggest an original understanding
that anticipated the nineteenth-century position.  While that as-
sumption appears reasonable, the disagreement in nineteenth-
century literature forces us to ask if the corollary is also true:
does an ongoing lack of consensus in the nineteenth century sug-
gest the absence of an original understanding on the subject?  If
the answer is yes, and I propose it is, then it forces us to consider
where scholars and judges should turn if they want to move be-
yond the acrimonious current debates about free exercise juris-
prudence and forge consensus.
V
CAN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FREE EXERCISE
MATERIALS HELP CONTEXTUALIZE EARLY
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT?
Originalists have long argued that research into nineteenth-
century jurisprudence on free exercise exemptions would con-
204 See generally  Lash, supra  note 9, at 1117-18 (“The federalist First Amendment
left little room for religious exemptions. . . . The Founding, however, is not the end
of the story. . . . By Reconstruction . . . a very different picture had emerged.”).
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firm an original understanding that courts could rely on as a way
to avoid confusing Supreme Court precedents in the area of free
exercise.  However, nineteenth-century cases and commentaries
suggest that there was no original understanding of free exercise
clauses that can serve as a focal point for the Supreme Court’s
contemporary free exercise jurisprudence.  If free exercise de-
bates are to move from their current state, scholars and judges
must move away from originalism and instead try to articulate
compelling new approaches to reading Supreme Court prece-
dents and thinking about policy.  Can nineteenth-century history
help us interpret early Supreme Court precedents on free exer-
cise?  I believe so.
In shaping its current antiexemptions interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has relied heavily on
its early opinions.  Of them, the most important precedent is the
1878 case of Reynolds v. United States , which involved a request
to be exempted on grounds of conscience from antipolygamy
laws. Reynolds  is almost universally interpreted today as an
opinion that established a categorical, antiexemptions posi-
tion.205  A majority of the Court in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith  justified its
adoption of a categorical antiexemption principle by stating that
this principle had been adopted in Reynolds  and never over-
ruled.206  However, Justice Souter has recently suggested that
those who disapprove of the current jurisprudence might want to
revisit the question of Reynolds .207
205 Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager are typical in saying that “[i]n
Reynolds v. United States , it should be remembered, the Court rejected not only the
claim of the Mormons to a constitutional right to practice polygamy; it also rejected
as unthinkable the idea of each religious believer creating a microenvironment of
law molded to her separate beliefs.”  Eisgruber & Sager, supra  note 15, at 1246.
206 Such justification is as follows:
“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for
religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law
not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.  The mere
possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns
of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of polit-
ical responsibilities (footnote omitted).”  We first had occasion to assert
that principle in Reynolds v. United States  . . . .
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)).
207 Justice Souter suggested that “Reynolds  . . . [is] open to the reading that the
Clause sometimes protects religious conduct from enforcement of generally applica-
ble laws; that the Clause never protects religious conduct from the enforcement of
generally applicable laws; or that the Clause does not protect religious conduct at
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Reynolds  is not a very clear opinion when one examines it
closely.  The opinion identifies in the writings of the Founders a
series of principles that, taken together, seem to repeat the prin-
ciple that appears to have existed from the time of the Founding
right through the nineteenth century:  people have a right to en-
gage in any behavior that (i) constitutes “worship” and (ii) is
peaceable and orderly.208  As we have seen, however, this does
not tell us whether the Court believes exemptions can ever be
appropriate.  And on this question, the case is not explicit.
Justice Souter is the only Justice in recent years to focus on the
ambiguities of Reynolds  and to point out that judges were not
always so certain that Justices on the Reynolds  Court thought
they were precluding federal judges from ever granting exemp-
tions.209  Surely at some point, scholars, judges, and practitioners
who wish to revisit Smith  will accept Souter’s invitation to recon-
sider the conventional wisdom that Reynolds  is obviously and ab-
solutely inconsistent with an interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause that permits judges to grant exemptions.  In evaluating
whether the conventional wisdom is correct, the nineteenth-cen-
tury materials that we have discussed may be of help.  Contem-
porary interpretations of Reynolds tend to be highly
decontextualized and do not consider how language in the opin-
ion reflects one or another of the competing views of free exer-
cise.  Nineteenth-century history of free exercise jurisprudence
provides the tools necessary to gain a fuller and more nuanced
understanding of this crucial precedent.
Reynolds v. United States  involved a Mormon’s request for a
free exercise exemption from antipolygamy laws.  The Supreme
Court denied the petitioner George Reynolds an exemption from
these laws, stating that if it had been willing to accept Reynolds’s
all.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 575
n.6 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted).  Justice Souter goes on to say:
As for the cases on which Smith primarily relied as establishing the rule it
embraced, Reynolds v. United States and Minersville School Dist. v. Gobi-
tis , their subsequent treatment by the Court would seem to require rejec-
tion of the Smith rule. Reynolds . . . has been read as consistent with the
principle that religious conduct may be regulated by general or targeting
law only if the conduct “pose[s] some substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order.”
Id.  at 569 (citations omitted).
208 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-65 (1878).
209 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye , 508 U.S. at 569 (Souter, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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right to engage in such activity on grounds of conscience, society
could “exist only in name.”210  The decision to deny an exemp-
tion for something so apparently “private” as marriage and the
apocalyptic language that is used led many to assume that the
Court was rejecting the idea of exemptions under any
circumstances.211
To determine whether this assumption is warranted, one
should at least consider nineteenth-century legal history.  The
history offers us a view into the interpretations of the Free Exer-
cise Clause that were considered plausible when Reynolds  was
decided.  Furthermore, a number of nineteenth-century judges
and scholars specifically asked how courts should handle a re-
quest for exemptions from antipolygamy laws.  Pro- and anti-
exemption thinkers all agreed that such requests should be
denied, but they disagreed on the reasoning.  Antiliberals obvi-
ously felt that Mormons had no more right to exemptions than
anyone else—meaning they had no right at all.  But liberal think-
ers who vigorously asserted the power of judges to grant free ex-
ercise exemptions and urged judges to be sensitive to situations
where exemptions might be appropriate also insisted that
polygamists could not receive free exercise exemptions.  Any re-
reading of Reynolds  should consider whether the opinion reflects
obvious familiarity or agreement with either (i) a pro-exemption
but antipolygamy position or (ii) a general antiexemption
position.
A. Mormonism and Polygamy
Before considering the implications of nineteenth-century
literature on polygamy, we should first consider why nineteenth-
century jurists found themselves discussing polygamy so often
and why so many Americans viewed it with particular alarm.  Po-
lygamy had been a subject of study and fear among nineteenth-
century Americans even before the Mormons began to publicly
teach and practice their doctrine of plural marriage.212  However,
210 Reynolds , 98 U.S. at 167.
211 See, e.g. , Lupu, supra  note 15, at 261.  In short, the Court had adopted an
antiliberal position of the type espoused by Justice Gibson and discussed supra Part
I.B.
212 Francis Lieber’s 1838 treatise MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS, supra note 64,
at 389-90, was written before the Mormons began to practice polygamy.  Neverthe-
less, it discussed the harms of polygamy in Muslim societies.  Even earlier in 1813,
the judge in People v. Philips , while exempting a Catholic priest from a subpoena
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the revelation that a powerful American religious sect was cham-
pioning the practice made polygamy an explosive subject.  To
help explain this reaction, I will briefly recount here the rise of
Mormonism and the Mormon practice of polygamy, and I will
discuss the reasons for the widespread concern about polygamy
among Americans.
Depending on one’s point of view, Mormonism was either a
new sect of Christianity or a new religion.213  One of the new
religious movements that arose in the aftermath of the Second
Great Awakening,214 Mormonism began with revelations suppos-
edly received by Joseph Smith in upstate New York around
1827.215  After Smith published his revelations as The Book of
Mormon ,216 his followers organized themselves into the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which grew rapidly.217  Mem-
bers of the new church, commonly known as Mormons, were dis-
tinguished by their new scripture and by their well-organized and
hierarchical church structure, with the church hierarchy initially
that would have required him to break the seal of the confessional, declared that
polygamy and human sacrifice was licentious and socially harmful and thus could
never be exempted under the New York Constitution, which only protected religious
acts that were neither licentious nor socially harmful. See SAMPSON, supra  note 133,
at 112-13.
213 On the question of whether Mormonism should be counted a new religion, see
Jan Shipps, Is Mormonism Christian?  Reflections on a Complicated Question , in
MORMONS AND MORMONISM 76-98 (Eric A. Eliason ed., 2001).
214 For a discussion of the origins of Mormon ideas and their relationship to other
ideas current in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century America, see JOHN L.
BROOKE, THE REFINER’S FIRE:  THE MAKING OF MORMON COSMOLOGY, 1644–1844
(1994).  For an analysis of how Joseph Smith was directly affected by the revivals
that accompanied the Second Great Awakening, see KLAUS J. HANSEN, MORMON-
ISM AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 45-83 (1981).
215 The early history of Joseph Smith’s visions is not entirely clear because Smith’s
own recollections were recorded long after the actual occurrence of these visions.  In
1827, Joseph Smith astounded his family by revealing that for almost five years, he
had been the recipient of visits from an angel who had shown him the resting place
of a new scripture and had given him a miraculous device that allowed him to trans-
late the book. LEONARD J. ARRINGTON & DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERI-
ENCE:  A HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 8-16 (1979).  For a list of Mormon
accounts of these early experiences, see the bibliographic essay in RONALD WALKER
ET AL., MORMON HISTORY 5-9 (2001).  For summaries of the traditional Mormon
history of this time, see HANSEN, supra  note 214, at 4-10.
216 See ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra  note 215, at 12-14; EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE
& RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS:  A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830–1900, at 48-51 (1988);
HANSEN, supra  note 214, at 5-6.
217 ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra note 215, at 20-21; RICHARD L. BUSHMAN, JO-
SEPH SMITH AND THE BEGINNINGS OF MORMONISM 143-59 (1984); HANSEN,
supra  note 214, at 37-38.
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headed by the prophet Joseph Smith himself.  Smith organized
the Mormons into economically self-sufficient, politically well-
organized communities.
To the minds of many Americans, Mormon beliefs were dan-
gerously heterodox.  Latent tensions were often exacerbated by
the fact that Mormon communities were carefully and efficiently
structured in a way to maximize the political and economic
power of the community, and Mormons sometimes used their
power to prosper at the expense of other citizens.218  In constant
conflict with their neighbors, the Mormons moved en masse from
New York to Ohio, to Missouri, and then to Nauvoo, Illinois,
where they established what was in essence a city-state which was
guarded by its own Mormon militia.219  In Nauvoo, the Mormon
218 Joseph Smith and other Mormon leaders maintained tight control over their
communities.  These leaders not only coordinated the economic activities of the be-
lievers, but they had Mormons vote in blocks.  Mormons thus had disproportionate
economic and political power in the areas where they settled.  R. Kent Fielding, The
Mormon Economy in Kirtland, Ohio , 27 UTAH HIST. Q. 331, 343 (1959); see gener-
ally  Marvin S. Hill et al., The Kirtland Economy Revisited:  A Market Critique of
Sectarian Economics , 17 BYU STUD. 391 (1977).  Wherever the Mormons went,
however, the practice of pooling resources and squeezing out economic competitors,
and their tendency to vote in blocks, gave Mormon leaders unusual power in the
communities where they settled and led to great resentment on the part of non-
Mormons. BUSHMAN, supra note 217, at 143-78.  For general studies of Mormon
economic history and its development in the nineteenth century, see generally LEO-
NARD J. ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM:  AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE
LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830–1900 (1958); LOWRY NELSON, THE MORMON VILLAGE:
A PATTERN AND TECHNIQUE OF LAND SETTLEMENT (1952).  Among the develop-
ments was the beginning of the “law of consecration,” which placed much of the
disposable wealth of the Mormon community into the control of the church leaders.
As one historian describes it:
The system was intended to work as follows:  those entering the order were
asked to “consecrate” their property and belongings to the church “with a
covenant and a deed which cannot be broken.”  Every member, in return,
would then be made “a steward over his own property, or that which he has
received by consecration, as much as is sufficient for himself and his fam-
ily.”  Any surplus would then “be kept to administer to those who have
not, from time to time, that every man who has need may be amply sup-
plied and receive according to his wants . . . .”
HANSEN, supra  note 214, at 124. See also BUSHMAN, supra  note 217, at 175-76;
FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 216, at 223.  On consecration specifically, see
generally Leonard J. Arrington, Early Mormon Communitarianism:  The Law of
Consecration and Stewardship,  7 W. HUMAN. REV. 341 (1953).  These tensions came
to be exacerbated by rumors of unusual sexual practices among the Mormons—a
possible sign that the practice of polygamy had already begun in this period. B.
CARMON HARDY, SOLEMN COVENANT:  THE MORMON POLYGAMOUS PASSAGE 60
(1992); RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY:  A HISTORY 6-12
(1989).
219 FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 216, at 73-74.
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community experienced a crisis brought about by the newly es-
tablished Mormon practice of polygamy.
In 1844, a dissident Mormon leader in Nauvoo published an
editorial disclosing that Smith had revealed to a handful of Mor-
mon leaders the secret doctrine of “celestial marriage” that,
among other things, required many Mormon men to engage in
polygamy.220  It soon became clear that Smith, along with other
Mormon leaders, secretly had taken multiple wives.221  Outraged
by the unauthorized disclosure of the officially secret practice,
Joseph Smith ordered his militia to destroy the dissident Mor-
mon press.  Shortly thereafter, state authorities indicted Smith
and his brother Hyrum for incitement to riot.  Taken from
Nauvoo, the two were imprisoned and subsequently lynched by
an anti-Mormon mob.222
After a split in the community, a faction led by Brigham Young
attracted the majority of Mormons.223  Convinced that his com-
munity would get no peace in any of the existing states of the
union, Young led this group on a mass exodus westward to the
deserts of what would become Utah.224  In their new home,
Young’s branch of the Mormons established a distinctive theo-
cratic society, marked by strong church control, the practice of
polygamy, and what some non-Mormons took to be a pattern of
discrimination against non-Mormons.225
220 See HARDY, supra note 218, at 6-12; VAN WAGONER, supra note 218, at 27-35,
47-59.
221 In the 1840s, Smith informed a small circle of Mormon leaders of a divine
revelation that required some Mormon men to take plural wives. HARDY, supra
note 218, at 9.  Those in the know feared, with good reason, that many Mormons
would resist the doctrine. Id.  Indeed, while the doctrine was secret, Mormon wo-
men, unaware that Smith had formally established the practice, protested the actions
of some married men—going so far as to establish a “Female Relief Society” as an
instrument for “suppressing bigamy and adultery.” Id.  at 8-9.
222 See ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra  note 215, at 77-82; HANSEN, supra  note 214,
at 1-11. For a useful timeline, situating this event in the larger context of Mormon
history, see JAN SHIPPS, MORMONISM:  THE STORY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS TRADI-
TION 161-67 (1985).
223 See ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra  note 215, at 83-85.
224 Id. at 95-117; see also SHIPPS, supra  note 222, at 161-63.
225 The church in Utah controlled a cooperative of Mormon merchants and pro-
hibited Mormons from trading with gentiles. See FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra
note 216, at 222.  The Mormon Church also controlled the administration of justice
in Mormon society.  It adjudicated disputes between Mormons in Mormon courts,
which did not follow traditional common law rules of procedure and pleading and,
more strikingly, abandoned the traditional system of adversarial justice. Id.  at 216-
19.
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Notwithstanding the many other sources of tension, it was the
Mormon practice of polygamy more than any other that was used
as justification for the federal attempt to break the Mormon
Church and limit its control over Utah.  Just prior to the Civil
War, the U.S. government decided to stamp out the practice of
polygamy in its Western territories and to break the power of the
Mormon Church that sanctioned the practice.226  Mormons re-
sisted the U.S. government’s attempts to enforce its anti-
polygamy legislation in the territories.227  Thus began a twenty-
year struggle that came to be known as the Mormon controversy.
The controversy would provoke discussion in cases and commen-
taries over precisely the question of how courts should respond
to a Mormon request for free exercise exemptions from anti-
polygamy laws.  Ultimately, it would give rise to seminal Su-
preme Court litigation over the nature of federal free exercise
guarantees and, in particular, over the question of free exercise
exemptions.
B. Nineteenth-Century Fears About the Physical and Social
Effects of Mormon Polygamy
Why did the American public and the U.S. government care so
much about the Mormon practice of polygamy?  Some have ar-
gued that antipolygamy legislation was simply a convenient tool
for anti-Mormon constituencies.228  Others have argued that anti-
polygamists were engaged in an early human rights campaign de-
signed to liberate women in the same way that abolitionists
wanted to liberate the slaves.229  However, these arguments do
not adequately consider the discussions of polygamy, particularly
226 See generally  the discussion in GORDON, supra  note 63, at 57-65, 81-83.
227 See generally ARRINGTON & BITTON, supra  note 215, at 170-84.
228 See, e.g. , FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 216, at 246.
229 See GORDON, supra  note 63 at 49, 55-83; Sarah Barringer Gordon, “Our Na-
tional Hearthstone”:  Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the Sentimental Campaign Against
Moral Diversity in Antebellum America , 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 305 (1996).
Mary Campbell has pointed out, however, that these explanations appear reductive
and do not adequately explain the behavior of some major antipolygamy actors.
Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay’s Horses:  The Federal Response to Mormon Polygamy,
1854–1887 , 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 51-61 (2001).  To some extent, Campbell
may have oversimplified the political and “feminist” explanations for the polygamy
controversy, but her main point is worth bearing in mind.  The Mormons antago-
nized all sorts of special interest groups in America.  However, it is hard to imagine
either the political debates about polygamy or the legal discussions about polygamy
taking the form that they did, if polygamy had not been seen as an almost uniquely
threatening practice.
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Mormon polygamy, that one finds in judicial opinions and legal
treatises.
Nineteenth-century opinions and treatises, some written
before Mormons began to practice polygamy, make clear that
Americans believed polygamy harmed the health and psyche of
polygamists, their wives, and their children.  Drug addiction is
often viewed today as a “private” problem that must be regu-
lated because of its immediate and massive social consequences.
So it was with polygamy in the nineteenth century.  This belief
helped shape the attitude of judges and commentators toward
the question of free exercise exemptions for polygamists, as well
as the different tacks that liberal and antiliberal writers took
when the subject came up.
Antiliberal writers simply did not think the issue worth dis-
cussing in any detail.  Because judges could never exempt people
on grounds of conscience from generally applicable, duly enacted
laws outside the area of speech, they obviously could not exempt
Mormons from antipolygamy laws.  It was liberal  writers who
needed to justify their belief that, notwithstanding Mormon be-
lief in the mandatory nature of polygamy, Mormons could not be
exempted from state laws banning the practice.  Ironically, then,
it was liberal rather than antiliberal commentators who wrote in
the most detail about the intrinsically harmful nature of
polygamy.
Among the problems that nineteenth-century Americans asso-
ciated with polygamy was the spread of poverty, disease, and
crime.  During the Victorian era, self-styled medical “experts”
developed medical theories that jibed neatly with contemporary
notions of sexual morality.  They argued that self-indulgence,
particularly sexual self-indulgence, led to “lassitude” and thus to
illness and destitution.230  Furthermore, American doctors
presented “evidence” that polygamists might pass some of their
lassitude to their children.231  A presentation at the New Orleans
230 “The common belief in a generative biology of fixed capacities held that an
inverse relationship existed between spermatic depletion and man’s health and en-
ergy.” HARDY, supra note 218, at 88.  Indulgence with one’s seed would inevitably
lead to lassitude in both mind and body. Id.  These theories were common in Eu-
rope as well as the United States. See id.  at 108 n.29.  For an example of an Ameri-
can work espousing this theory, see RUSSELL THACHER TRALL, HOME TREATMENT
FOR SEXUAL ABUSES:  A PRACTICAL TREATISE (N.Y., Fowler & Wells 1853). See
generally JOHN S. HALLER, JR. & ROBIN M. HALLER, THE PHYSICIAN AND SEXUAL-
ITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 91-113, 134-41 (1974).
231 Some doctors argued that excessive sexual activity among polygamous men in
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Academy of Sciences in 1861, for instance, catalogued the physi-
cal abnormalities that a doctor had reported in the offspring of
Mormon polygamists.232
The practice of polygamy was also thought to affect the psyche
of those who engaged in it.  The historian Philip Gibbs describes
the nineteenth-century view of a man as “an animal whose dan-
gerous instincts were ready to surface at every opportunity.
Once man succumbed to these instincts he was forever lost in a
morass of passions and impulses.”233  Among the most dangerous
instincts was lust, which led men to collect women, often vio-
lently, for sexual service.  Such a practice, once begun, was addic-
tive and, in a very real sense, contagious.234  As one well-known
social and prison reformer wrote in 1845, “[t]he sight of evil, as
by contagion, awakens the desire to commit evil.”235  And the
danger of immoral behavior spreading was particularly acute if
the behavior disempowered women who would otherwise check
men’s worst impulses.236  In short, many nineteenth-century
Utah would lead to the evolution of a “new race” of inferior people. See generally
Gary L. Bunker & Davis Bitton, Polygamous Eyes:  A Note on Mormon Physiog-
nomy , DIALOGUE, Fall 1979, at 114, 114; Lester E. Bush, Jr., Mormon ‘Physiology,’
1850–1875 , 56 BULL. HIST. MED. 218, 226 (1982).
232 Stanley S. Ivins, Notes on Mormon Polygamy , 10 W. HUMAN. REV. 229, 238
(1956) (citing Samuel A. Cartwright & C.G. Forshey, Hereditary Descent; or, De-
pravity of the Offspring of Polygamy Among the Mormons , 30 DE BOW’S REV. 206,
209-10 (1861)).
233 Phillip A. Gibbs, Self Control and Male Sexuality in the Advice Literature of
Nineteenth Century America, 1830–1860 , J. AM. CULTURE, Summer 1986, at 37, 39.
234 Indeed, this belief in the contagiousness of vice powerfully influenced the con-
stitutional jurisprudence in the nineteenth century. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE
PEOPLE’S WELFARE:  LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
26-42 (1996).  It is also worth noting that some segments of antebellum-American
legal philosophy had come to embrace the seemingly “postmodern” notion that legal
concepts can only be understood in the context of a larger culture.  Thus, all the
“rights” that Americans were guaranteed could only be realized if American society
itself preserved its core values.  For example, in 1861 the Chief Justice of Maryland
defended the practice of allowing mayors discretion to imprison “lewd women”
whenever they saw fit.  “[U]nder the police power . . . persons disturbing the public
peace, persons guilty of a nuisance, or obstructing the public highways, and the like
offenses, may be summarily arrested and fined, without any infraction of that part of
the Constitution which apportions the administration of the judicial power.” Id.  at
169 (quoting Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331, 336 (1861)).  As the case above illus-
trates, sexual immorality was among the “like offenses” that the Maryland Constitu-
tion did not protect.  Id.  at 162-71.
235 THE PRISON ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, FIRST REPORT 34-35 (1844) (quot-
ing William H. Channing).
236 See generally BETTY A. DEBERG, UNGODLY WOMEN:  GENDER AND THE
FIRST WAVE OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISM (1990) (discussing the unique role of
women in American Protestant theology); Michael Les Benedict, Victorian Moral-
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Americans believed that polygamy led to immoral, unhealthy,
and ultimately vicious behavior.  If unchecked, it would lead indi-
rectly but inevitably to widespread unemployment, poverty, dis-
ease, and crime.237
These fears were complicated and reinforced as they became
wrapped up in arguments about the nature of European culture
and its relative superiority vis-à-vis the cultures of Africa and
Asia.  Francis Lieber, who articulated a position for free exercise
exemptions, argued long before the public learned of the Mor-
mon practice of polygamy that polygamy had the inevitable ef-
fect of retarding a society’s ability to develop.238  Lieber’s work
was inevitably affected by nineteenth-century assumptions about
gender, race, and culture—many of which would be seen as
deeply offensive today.239  Building on these prejudices, Lieber
harnessed a hodgepodge of evidence, mostly from European sec-
ondary sources, that tied the apparent weakness of Muslim soci-
ety to the sexual excesses he associated with Muslim polygamy.
The practice resulted, wrote Lieber, in enervation that is passed
on to offspring, thus leading to a weaker race.240  Furthermore,
he argued that a comparative study of history and of other cul-
tures reveals that family structure helps determine the character-
istics of a society.  According to Lieber, liberal society cannot
survive unless family structures support liberal attitudes, and
only monogamous structures can support liberty.241  Drawing
upon academic works printed in Germany and in Oxford, En-
ism and Civil Liberty in the Nineteenth-Century United States , in THE CONSTITU-
TION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE:  CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 99, 106-07 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992).  Interestingly, for-
eign observers as well as Americans took this position.  Tocqueville asserted that
America was prosperous and successful because “of all countries in the world
America is the one in which the marriage tie is most respected.” ALEXIS DE TOC-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George
Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835).
237 See  Benedict, supra  note 236, at 93.
238 See  discussion supra  Part III.C (discussing Lieber’s view on polygamy).  His
1838 treatise MANUAL ON POLITICAL ETHICS, supra note 64, was written before the
Mormons began to practice polygamy and was focused on polygamy in Muslim
societies.
239 For works highlighting Lieber’s prejudices, see GUNNELL, supra  note 65, at 25-
32; Burgett, supra  note 65.
240 LIEBER, supra  note 64, at 140 (“[Roman history reveals that] marriage, viewed
with regard to the merest political utility, is of essential importance; as likewise late
statistical accounts seem satisfactorily to prove that concubinage extends its enerva-
tion to the offspring.”).
241 Id. at 137-38.
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gland, Lieber argued that the poverty, tyranny, and violence of
barbaric “Eastern” civilizations reflect something called “the pa-
triarchal principle.”  Societies can only break from this principle
and advance if they are monogamous.242  Lieber stated, “[T]he
patriarchal principle . . . if family relations are made the funda-
mental principle of the state, fetters the people in stationary des-
potism,—a species of government to which, it seems to me,
polygamy must almost irresistibly lead . . . .”243
Confirming people’s worst fears about polygamy, Lieber’s
ideas helped provide a larger sociological and anthropological
paradigm in which educated nineteenth-century Americans could
place their personal repugnance for polygamy (and their fears
about its social consequences).244  As the historian B. Carmon
Hardy has noted:
The polemics mounted against Mormon plural marriage
were so strident and, in many cases, distant from the views of
our time that it is easy to dismiss them as hysterical or, in any
case, unpersuasive.  We must not forget, however, that nine-
teenth-century value constructions were as crucially felt as any
of our own. . . . [Polygamy], it was widely believed, directly
threatened those structures that had won for Western civiliza-
tion predominance abroad and civility at home.245
Even people sensitive to the religious rights of Mormons could
be terrified of Mormon polygamy.  For evidence, one need look
no further than the Mormon community itself and the reactions
of some Mormons to rumors and eventual confirmation that their
religion approved the practice of polygamy.  When Joseph Smith
first began initiating church elders into the secret polygamy doc-
trine, a number of Mormons appear to have broken from his
church, at least temporarily.246  Rumors about the doctrine ap-
242 Id.  at 389 (relying on the works of the eminent German classicist Arnold Her-
man Ludwig Heeren).
243 Id.  at 390.
244 Lieber’s writings were polemical, arguing that Utah could not be accepted as a
state in the Union until the power of the Mormon Church was broken and the prac-
tice of polygamy eradicated.  Francis Lieber, Shall Utah Be Admitted into the
Union? , PUTNAM’S MONTHLY, Mar. 1855, at 225, 228, 233-36.
245 HARDY, supra note 218, at 60.
246 See id.  at 8-12.  In 1838, Oliver Cowdery, one of Smith’s first disciples, was
initiated into Smith’s still-secret doctrine that polygamy was to be practiced by
Church leaders.  He seems to have broken with Smith over this issue.  Later he
wrote bitterly of polygamy:
Such may do for the followers of Mohamet, it may have done some
thousands of years ago, but no people professing to be governed by the
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parently shocked some in the community.247  When a disen-
franchised elder confirmed the rumors, he warned in
Lieberesque terms that Smith and other church leaders were en-
gaging in a practice that,
if exposed in its naked deformity, would make the virtuous
mind revolt with horror; a system in the exercise of which lays
prostrate all the dearest ties in our social relations—the glori-
ous fabric upon which human happiness is based—ministers to
the worst passions of our nature and throws us back into the
benighted regions of the dark ages.248
After Smith was killed by an angry mob, some Mormons be-
came convinced that Smith must have been duped by a satanic,
false revelation regarding polygamy.  One of them wrote after
Smith’s death:
[I]t would seem almost impossible that there could be found a
set of men and women, in this age of the world, with the reve-
lations of God in their hands, who could invent and propagate
doctrines so ruinous to society, so debasing and demoralising
as the doctrine of a man having a plurality of wives.249
After the majority of Mormons, however, followed the pro-
polygamy leader Brigham Young to Utah and established the po-
lygamous community that would attract national attention,250 a
disgruntled minority organized an antipolygamous Mormon
sect.251
pure and holy principles of the Lord Jesus, can hold up their heads before
the world at this distance of time, and be guilty of such folly—such
wrong—such abomination.
VAN WAGONER, supra  note 218, at 12.  Another leader of the church, once a mem-
ber of its First Presidency, also broke with Smith over the issue of polygamy. Id.  at
54.
247 In 1841, while the practice was still secret, Smith tested Mormon attitudes to-
ward polygamy by suggesting in a public sermon that Muslim converts to Mormon-
ism should be permitted to keep multiple wives.  The test was not a success.  His
wife publicly upbraided him, saying, “[I]t will never do it is all but Blassphemy [sic]
you must take back what you have said to day it is outragious [sic] it would ruin us as
a people.” Id.  at 51 (citing Joseph Lee Robinson, Journal 23-24 (unpublished and on
file with BYU Library)).  At roughly the same time, Smith’s brother Hyrum (simi-
larly uninitiated) denounced the practice in the strongest of terms:  “If an angel from
heaven should come and preach such doctrine [you] would be sure to see his cloven
foot and [a] cloud of blackness over his head.” Id.  at 54 (citing Levi Richards, Jour-
nal (May 14, 1843) (unpublished and on file with LDS Archives)).
248 Id. at 67 (quoting Sylvester Emmons, Introductory, The Nauvoo Expositor
(June 7, 1844)).
249 Id.  at 72 (quoting Sidney Rigdon, Latter Day Saints’ Messenger and Advocate
(Oct. 15, 1844)).
250 Id.
251 Id.  at 72-79.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 69  9-MAR-07 8:56
2006] Free Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of Polygamy 437
C. Nineteenth-Century Legal Thinkers on Whether Free
Exercise Guarantees Allowed Mormon Polygamists to
Violate Antipolygamy Laws
Given the widespread social harms attributed to Mormon po-
lygamy, the practice was naturally viewed by non-Mormons as
one that could legitimately be regulated under the police powers
of government.  But the Mormons’ insistence that polygamy was
a sacred duty raised the issue of free exercise exemptions.
Should Mormons be exempted on grounds of conscience from
the otherwise valid laws banning polygamy?  Both antiliberals
and liberals responded in the negative.  But the reasoning
seemed different.
If one took an antiliberal, antiexemptions interpretation of
free exercise clauses, no American could plead a constitutional
right to be released on the grounds of conscience from the obli-
gation to obey such laws.  Thus, antiliberals would dismiss the
claim without much discussion.  Since no one can receive an ex-
emption, Mormons cannot either.  This analysis is implicit in the
opinion of the Maine court in Donahoe v. Richards .252  Citing
Gibson’s antiliberal opinions in Lesher  and Gratz , the court al-
lowed a school to expel a schoolgirl who demanded that she be
permitted to do reading exercises from a different translation of
the Bible on the following grounds:
The State is governed by its own views of duty.  The right or
wrong of the State, is the right or wrong as declared by legisla-
tive Acts constitutionally passed.  It may pass laws against po-
lygamy, yet the Mormon or Mahomedan cannot claim an
exemption from their operation, or freedom from punishment
imposed upon their violation. . . . It may establish a day of rest
as a civil institution, though the effect of it may be to deprive
the Jew of one sixth of his time for purposes of labor or of
business.253
Strikingly, however, judges and commentators who embraced
the idea of exemptions were also universally opposed to the idea
of granting religious exemptions from antipolygamy laws.  They
emphasized, however, that this opposition was because the prac-
tice fell squarely into (and arguably epitomized) the class of
“nonpeaceable” behavior that was axiomatically deeply harmful
252 See  38 Me. 379 (1854).
253 Id.  at 410.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE202.txt unknown Seq: 70  9-MAR-07 8:56
438 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 369
and for that reason fell outside the scope of protected constitu-
tional behavior.
In the case of People v. Philips , which was written before the
Mormons had begun to practice polygamy, the court granted an
exemption for a refusal to provide testimony essential to resolv-
ing a serious crime.  The court admitted that this had negative
social repercussions.  The Philips  court stressed, however, that
there were limits to its willingness to exempt. It could not pro-
vide exemptions for acts that were “licentious” or were more di-
rectly and direly harmful to society (“something actively not
negatively injurious . . . of a deep dye and of an extensively inju-
rious nature”).254  Among the acts it listed as intolerable and
unexemptable were, in Walsh’s paraphrase, “engaging in incest,
polygamy, wife-burning, bacchanalian orgies, or human sacri-
fices, or by establishing the inquisition, or by fanatically attempt-
ing to pull up the pillars of society.”255
After the public became aware that Mormons were practicing
polygamy, liberal commentators regularly considered whether
exemptions should be made available to Mormon polygamists.
Sedgwick seemed unsure whether free exercise guarantees might
plausibly be invoked as a ground to give Mormons a right to ex-
emptions from antipolygamy laws.  If they could, he suggested
such exemptions would force Americans to back away from their
commitment to absolute religious freedom.256  Other liberal
thinkers, however, made a point to stress that their liberal ap-
proach to exemptions would not protect an act that caused the
kind of harms associated with polygamy.
In his liberal treatise On Civil Liberty and Self-Government ,
Lieber rejected the easy antiliberal justifications for denying
Mormons free exercise exemptions.  He stressed that religious
freedom prevented the U.S. government from dismissing Mor-
mon beliefs or banning them on the grounds that they were not
truly “religious” beliefs that deserved protection under the First
Amendment:
As to that unhappy and most remarkable sect called the
Mormons . . . [w]hether they have fallen back into Buddhism,
254 Opinion of the court in People v. Philips , printed in SAMPSON, supra  note 133,
at 113.
255 Walsh, supra  note 44, at 89 (paraphrasing People v. Philips , printed in SAMP-
SON, supra  note 133, at 113-14).
256 See SEDGWICK, supra  note 177, at 607-08; see generally  discussion supra  Part
III.C.
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making their god a perfectible being, with parts and local
dwelling, cannot become a direct political question, however it
may indirectly affect society in all its parts.257
As shown earlier in this Article, Lieber made clear that in at
least some contexts, government should be obliged to tolerate
practices commanded by religion unless it could show that these
practices directly  harmed others in society.258  Consistent with
this, he appears to have assumed that to deny Mormons an ex-
emption, one would have to demonstrate that their practices, by
causing such direct harm, could be characterized as nonpeace-
able behavior and thus ineligible for exemption.  But, given his
previous discussion of polygamy’s harms in Manual of Political
Ethics , Lieber found it easy to argue that polygamy was directly
harmful and could thus legitimately be banned on grounds of so-
cial necessity:
The other difficulty will arise out of the question which every
honest man will put to himself, can we admit as a state a soci-
ety of men who deny the very first principle, not of our com-
mon law, not of christian politics, not of modern progress, but
of our whole western civilization, as contradistinguished from
oriental life—of that whole civilization in which we have our
being, and which is the precious joint product of christianity
and antiquity—who disavow monogamy.259
In his 1873 treatise on church and state, Joseph Thompson was
also ambivalent on the question of exemptions—apparently will-
ing to grant them in some circumstances, but unclear about when
exactly they were appropriate.260  He made a special point to ex-
plain to his readers that even under the most liberal application
of nineteenth-century free exercise doctrines, political branches
would be able to enforce a ban on polygamy on the grounds of
257 LIEBER, supra  note 66, at 101-02.
258 See  discussion supra  Part III.C (citing LIEBER, supra  note 66, at 100 n.1).
259 LIEBER, supra  note 66, at 102.
260 THOMPSON, supra  note 91, at 12-13.  Thompson described the text of the First
Amendment and concluded:
[B]rief as they are, they proclaim religious liberty, in the broadest sense, as
a fundamental right of citizens of the United States.  This means much
more than the toleration by law of differences of religious belief and of
different modes of worship. . . . Toleration is a concession, in part, of that
control over religion which the State assumes to exercise, but which it so
far allows to fall into abeyance.  Religious liberty, on the other hand, is
absolute freedom of religious opinion and worship, a vested right of con-
science, not derived through any grant of the civil power.
Id.  at 11-13.
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necessity.  While believers have a right to exemptions on grounds
of conscience, this right certainly falls away if the challenged law
is necessary for society’s very survival.261  After this statement of
general principles, he moved to a discussion of how they apply in
the case of Mormons.  First, according to Thompson, a society is
inevitably shaped by the nature of family structure in that soci-
ety.  Thus, to permit polygamy would indirectly but inevitably eat
at the foundations of the state:
Though no form of religious belief or worship, simply as such ,
can justly be proscribed in a free state, yet for reasons of pub-
lic morality, or for the safety and order of the Commonwealth,
the State may forbid and punish acts done in the name of re-
ligion; as, for instance, polygamy as practiced by the Mormons,
the infanticide of the Chinese, or the self-immolation of Hin-
doo devotees. . . . Thus, for example, the basis of the State is
the family,—the true norm  of society; and in Western civiliza-
tion, as contrasted with the Oriental, society is based upon
monogamy.262
Thompson additionally believed that antipolygamy laws were
necessary because the practice of polygamy led to the birth of
children who were liable to be impoverished—directly creating
intolerable social costs:
[With polygamy,] the State steps in, and says, “Marriage has
consequences that affect the welfare of the whole community.
It implies parentage and offspring; and the State cannot per-
mit relations between the sexes which may throw upon the
community the care of children whose parents make no provi-
sion for the family and the home.”  And so, by that law of self-
protection which inheres in society, as well as by that moral
sense which justifies monogamy, the State can legislate against
polygamy and fornication, though practised in the name of
religion.263
In sum, when Mormonism began to champion polygamy, legal
commentators anticipated that Mormons would claim a right to
exemptions from antipolygamy laws.  Polygamy was, in fact, a
test case for how far liberals were committed to free exercise ex-
emptions.  Almost all liberals seem to have agreed that polygamy
fell far beyond the pale of peaceable activity that was eligible for
free exercise exemptions.  In order to reconcile this view with
their broader commitment to religious freedom, they made an
261 Id.  at 15.
262 Id.  at 18-19.
263 Id.  at 21.
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effort carefully to articulate the harms that rendered it ineligible
for exemptions.
Almost all contemporary judges and commentators attribute
to the Reynolds  Court an antiliberal position that follows in most
respects the categorical, antiexemptions position articulated by
Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  In thinking
about whether Reynolds  really did adopt such a categorical posi-
tion, one must keep in mind that the nineteenth-century judges
and academics who were generally liberal on the question of free
exercise exemptions recoiled in horror from the thought that
polygamists might get exemptions.  They constructed arguments
for why, notwithstanding the need to grant exemptions for some
illegal actions, society could not survive if exemptions were
granted to polygamists.  In explaining why it was denying exemp-
tions, the Reynolds  court employed arguments that were most
fully articulated in the works of more liberal writers, and it re-
sembles the writings of some of these thinkers both in substance
and tone.
This is not to say definitively that the Reynolds  Court meant to
preclude exemptions in the case at bar but, at the same time, to
preserve the possibility of granting them in other circumstances.
If in places the opinion seems to echo the writings of Lieber, in
other places it recalls the antiliberal opinions of Justice Gibson.
More research needs to be done before we can confidently de-
scribe the principle that the Justices on the Reynolds  Court
thought they were laying down on the question of exemptions.  I
am currently working on another article in which I will attempt
to disentangle the mixed messages of Reynolds  and to provide a
convincing, contextualized interpretation of the opinion.
CONCLUSION
With a few notable exceptions, people to date have looked at
nineteenth-century free exercise jurisprudence as a tool to help
us understand the view of eighteenth-century Americans toward
the complex question of exemptions.  As helpful as the nine-
teenth-century legal materials may be in clarifying an original un-
derstanding of the Constitution, I suggest that their primary
practical value lies elsewhere.  Nineteenth-century free exercise
jurisprudence provides evidence that there was, in fact, no con-
sensus at the time of the Founding with respect to free exercise
clauses and the availability of free exercise exemptions.  While
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this information may be unwelcome to many seeking an original
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, it comes with a silver
lining.  Nineteenth-century cases and commentaries may help us
understand the Supreme Court’s earliest free exercise opinions,
particularly in the seminal cases arising out of the Mormon con-
troversy such as Reynolds v. United States ,264 Murphy v. Ram-
sey ,265 and United States v. Late Corp. of the Church of Latter-
day Saints .266
Justice Souter has already suggested that Americans recon-
sider Reynolds  to determine whether it is really inconsistent with
the idea of exemptions as so many assume.  Those who accept his
invitation will need to consider the nineteenth-century legal
materials that we have discussed in this Article.  These materials
suggest that, in the years before Reynolds , American legal think-
ers articulated both antiliberal and liberal positions on the ques-
tion of free exercise exemptions.  More interestingly, antiliberals
and liberals alike agreed that constitutional free exercise clauses
should not be interpreted to provide Mormon polygamists with a
right to exemptions from antipolygamy legislation.  Thus, the jus-
tices who denied George Reynolds an exemption from anti-
polygamy laws could plausibly have held either antiliberal
positions or liberal, pro-exemption positions.  More research is
necessary to determine whether the opinion draws rhetorically or
substantively from either of the competing strains of free exercise
thinking, and whether the conventional wisdom about its cate-
gorically antiexemptions philosophy should be rethought.
264 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
265 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
266 150 U.S. 145 (1893).
